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I. INTRODUCTION

The year 2019 was one of stasis and change, reaction and challenges to
practitioners, patentees and those discontented with patents, and the judiciary
itself. The year saw a comeback of sorts for the doctrine of equivalents, which has
been a quiet area of the law since the Supreme Court’s last word in Festo v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. in 2002.1 In 2019 there were no fewer than seven cases
decided by the Federal Circuit involving the doctrine, and its primary antithesis, the
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel. 2 The perennial issue of subject matter
eligibility remained uncertain with the Federal Circuit deciding that method of
treatment claims were patent-eligible as being an application of a natural law (and
the Supreme Court taking the Solicitor General’s advice and not granting certiorari
to review the wisdom of this dichotomy).3 Diagnostic method claims were another
matter, with the Federal Circuit maintaining its jurisprudence that claims to such
methods are almost per se patent-ineligible. In doing so, however, its Athena
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services LLC decision illustrated a court in frank
internal disagreement (if not disarray) in denying patentee’s petition for rehearing
en banc.4 The Supreme Court weighed in on the extent to which the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act changed the scope of novelty-destroying prior art (saying it
didn’t, despite an amicus brief to the contrary by the Act’s co-author, Rep. Lamar
Smith)5, and Section 112(a) came under scrutiny on both written description and
enablement issues.6 Finally, as a fixed constant in an otherwise changing universe,
the interference over CRISPR technology between the Broad Institute and its
colleagues and the University of California, Berkeley and its collaborators
maintained its measured pace to a determination of who was first to invent
CRISPR, and accordingly, who owns this important technology.7

1

See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Dennis Crouch, Doctrine of Equivalents at the Federal Circuit, Patently-O (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/11/doctrine-equivalents-federal.html [https://perma.cc/29JU24L7].

2

3

See Vanda Pharm., Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, No. 18-817 (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/
public/18-817.html [https://perma.cc/8QQT-H375].
4

915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

5

See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019).

6

Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Scis. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

7

Jon Cohen, The Latest Round in the CRISPR Patent Battle Has an Apparent Victor, But the Fight
Continues, SCIENCE MAG (Sep. 11, 2020, 6:40 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/09/
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Admittedly, choosing the top ten judicial decisions suffers from an inevitable
degree of subjectivity. However, we believe these decisions are among the most
important decisions of the year in biotechnology patent law even if others might
prefer to substitute a case or two for those on our list. All of the decisions discussed
in this article were delivered during the 2019 calendar year.8
II. TOP TEN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT LAW CASES OF 2019

We discuss the top ten biotechnology patent decisions below. These decisions
are not presented in any particular order. After consideration of individual judicial
decisions, we conclude by suggesting what prospective impact these decisions may
have on biotechnology patent law.
A. *Helsinn Healthcare v. Teva Pharmaceuticals (on-sale bar)
“Pigs fly!,” “Hell has frozen over!,” or less dramatically, “Supreme Court affirms
Federal Circuit decision!” all would be apt subtitles for any discussion of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Helsinn v. Teva.9 The question before the Court was
whether Congress intended, by passing the Smith-Leahy America Invents Act (AIA),
to change the status of “secret” sales so that they would not trigger the on-sale bar
of revised Section 102 by adding the phrase “or otherwise known to the public.” The
Federal Circuit held it had not done so, at least not effectively,10 and the Supreme
Court agreed.11
The decision is short (nine pages, with the legal basis of the Court’s opinion
starting at page five), unanimous (9–0 vote), handed down less than seven weeks
after oral argument, and authored by Justice Thomas, who often writes patent law
decisions that are not particularly contentious or for which one Justice does not

latest-round-crispr-patent-battle-has-apparent-victor-fight-continues [https://perma.cc/FHV6BY9W].
8

Much of the discussion of biotechnology law cases in this article is adapted, with full
permission, from case summaries written by Dr. Kevin E. Noonan on his leading biotechnology
patent law blog, www.PatentDocs.org. The authors wish to thank Bobbie Jo Horocofsky and Mary
Kate Workman for their brilliant research assistance. This article will be published in spring 2021
by the University of New Hampshire Law Review with whose permission the authors make it
available in final published form.
9

Helsinn, 139 S. Ct. at 628.

10

Id. at 630.

11

Id.
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have a particular interest.12 By way of reminder regarding the factual predicate of
the case, it arose over Hatch-Waxman litigation concerning Teva’s intention to
market a generic version of Helsinn’s intravenous formulations of palonosetron
used to reduce chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting (“CINV”).13 There were
four patents-in-suit: U.S. Patent Nos. 7,947,724, 7,947,725, 7,960,424, and 8,598,219;
only the ‘219 Patent was allowed and granted under the AIA changes in U.S. patent
law.14
A prior art patent (U.S. Patent No. 5,202,333)15 taught that palonosetron was
useful for treating CINV; the patents-in-suit were directed to novel formulations
comprising “unexpectedly low concentrations of palonosetron.”16 Claim 2 of the
‘725 Patent is representative of the pre-AIA patents-in-suit:
2. A pharmaceutically stable solution for reducing emesis or reducing the
likelihood of emesis comprising:
a) 0.05 mg/mL palonosetron hydrochloride, based on the weight of the free
base, in a sterile injectable aqueous carrier at a pH of from 4.5 to 5.5;
b) from 0.005 mg/mL to 1.0 mg/mL EDTA; and
c) mannitol in an amount sufficient to tonicify said solution, in a
concentration of from about 10 mg/ml to about 80 mg/ml.17

Claim 1 is representative of the ‘219 Patent [post-AIA].
1. A pharmaceutical single-use, unit-dose formulation for intravenous
administration to a human to reduce the likelihood of cancer chemotherapyinduced nausea and vomiting, comprising a 5 mL sterile aqueous isotonic solution,
said solution comprising:
palonosetron hydrochloride in an amount of 0.25 mg based on the weight of its
free base;
from 0.005 mg/mL to 1.0 mg/mL EDTA; and
from 10 mg/mL to about 80 mg/mL mannitol,
wherein said formulation is stable at 24 months when stored at room

12

See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (providing an
example of a Justice Thomas patent opinion).

13

Helsinn, 139 S. Ct. at 630–31.

14

Id. at 631 (discussing U.S. Patent No. 7,947,724 (filed July 21, 2005); U.S. Patent No. 7,947,725
(filed Mar. 24, 2006); U.S. Patent No. 7,960,424 (filed Mar. 24, 2006); and U.S. Patent No. 8,598,219
(filed May 23, 2013)).

15

Id. (referring to U.S. Patent No. 5,202,333 (filed May 22, 1991)).

16

Id.

17

‘725 Patent.
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temperature.18

“It [was] undisputed that each asserted claim covers the 0.25 mg dose of
palonosetron.” 19 Helsinn entered into a contract for supplying the claimed
formulation prior to the critical date, but contingent on FDA approval (which was
not obtained until after the critical date).20
The District Court found a sale or offer for sale prior to the critical date, but that
the invention was not ready for patenting with regard to the pre-AIA patents, and
that the AIA had changed the on-sale bar to require a public sale or offer for sale.21
Although the existence of the agreement and its terms were publicly known, the
parties had not disclosed the 0.25 mg palonosetron dose before the critical date.22
The District Court thus rejected Teva’s invalidity contentions based on the §102(b)
on-sale bar.23
The Federal Circuit reversed, in an opinion by Judge Dyk joined by Judges
Mayer and Moore.24 Using the framework set forth by the Court in Medicines Co. v.
Hospira, the panel found that the invention was “on sale” prior to the critical date by
applying “the law of contracts as generally understood” and “those activities that
would be understood to be commercial sales and offers for sale ‘in the commercial
community.’” 25 Under this analysis, the Court had little difficulty deciding that
there had been a sale before the critical date. 26 The contingent nature of FDA
approval did not refute this conclusionthe Court saying that commercial   ,
exemplified by provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), contemplate
“‘purported present sale of future goods . . . [which] operates as a contract to sell,’
UCC §2–105(2),” and that “[a] contract for sale that includes a condition precedent
is a valid and enforceable contract.” 27 The opinion also cited the Court’s own
precedent regarding the existence of a sale despite the presence of conditions
precedent to commercial transfer of goods, such as Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe,
18

Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

19

Id.

20

Id. at 1361–62.

21

Id. at 1360.

22

Id. at 1363.

23

Id.

24

Helsinn, 855 F.3d at 1356.

25

Helsinn, 855 F.3d at 1364; Kevin E. Noonan, The Medicines Company v. Hospira, Inc. (Fed. Cir.
2016) (en banc), Patent Docs (July 12, 2016), https://www.patentdocs.org/2016/07/the-medicinescompany-v-hospira-inc-fed-cir-2016-en-banc.html [https://perma.cc/6RGX-Z3LS].
26

Helsinn, 855 F.3d at 1364.

27

Id. at 1356 (citing BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1207 (2014)).
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Inc and C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc.28
The Court also rejected Helsinn’s contention that the AIA changed the on-sale
bar calculus to limit its application to public sales.29 Noting that confidential sales
did not per se prevent application of the on-sale bar prior to enactment of the AIA,
the opinion rejected arguments by Helsinn and amici (including the U.S.
government) that the AIA changed the law. These assertions were based almost
exclusively on statements from the Congressional record (which themselves were
directed not to on-sale activities but to public use). 30 It did not help Helsinn’s
argument in this regard that the panel identified Supreme Court precedent directly
contrary to their position, i.e Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829). 31
Accordingly, the opinion stated that “[w]e conclude that, after the AIA, if the
existence of the sale is public, the details of the invention need not be publicly
disclosed in the terms of sale” and thus invalidity of the ‘219 Patent was not
properly determined by the District Court.32
With regard to the question of whether the invention claimed in the patents-insuit was “ready for patenting“ prior to the critical date, the panel decided that it was,
because the invention had been reduced to practice before that date.33 This decision
depended, in part, on the parties’ stipulation that “they would contest ready for
patenting ‘only with respect to the limitations and intended uses of “reducing
emesis or reducing the likelihood of emesis” and “to reduce the likelihood of cancer
chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting “‘of the asserted claims’ and not ‘for
any other reason.’”34 The panel noted that its case law distinguished the standard
needed to show reduction to practice with regard to whether a pharmaceutical
invention would work for its intended purpose and the standard for FDA approval
of a new drug, citing Scott v. Finney.35 Specifically, the standard is that the invention
“works for its intended purpose ‘beyond a probability of failure’ but not ‘beyond a
possibility of failure.’” 36 The Federal Circuit found the District Court erred by
applying the FDA standard rather than the proper patent standard in making its
28

Id. at 1365–66 (citing Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 424 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2005) and
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
29

Id. at 1369–71.

30

Id. at 1368–69.

31

Id. at 1369.

32

Id. at 1371.

33

Id.

34

Helsinn, 855 F.3d at 1372.

35

Id. (citing Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1063–64 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).

36

Id. at 1372 (citing Scott, 34 F.3d 1062).
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erroneous determination that the invention was not “ready for patenting” before
the critical date. 37 This conclusion was supported by Helsinn’s own documents
(including portions of the patents’ prosecution histories), pre-litigation statements
and testimony. 38 And the opinion noted thatif the standard applied by the
District Court was correctHelsinn could not have filed a valid application prior to
the critical date, and “[s]uch a standard would preclude the filing of meritorious
patent applications in a wide variety of circumstances.”39
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the following Question
Presented: “Whether, under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, an inventor’s
sale of an invention to a third party that is obligated to keep the invention
confidential qualifies as prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of
the invention.” 40 The Court recognized that it had “never addressed the precise
question presented in this case,” but voiced its opinion that “our precedents suggest
that a sale or offer of sale need not make an invention available to the public.”41 The
Court based its decision on the well-established principle that, under prior versions
of Section 102, “secret sales” could trigger the on-sale bar.42 These cases were as
recent as Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 43 and as ancient as a trio of 19th Century
cases 44 (although to be honest these cases stand for the proposition that a sale
triggers the bar and not the issue of whether the sale was secret or public). The
opinion credits the Federal Circuit (saying without apparent irony that that Court
“has ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ over patent appeals, 28 U.S.C. §1295(a)”) with making
“explicit what was implicit in our precedents” with regard to the on-sale bar, citing
Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., in support
of its conclusion.45
Based on this various precedent, the Court was able to reach the conclusion that
Congress did not change what activities raised the on-sale bar which includes secret
sales, because there was insufficient evidence of that intent, citing Shapiro v. United
37

Id. at 1373.

38

Id. at 1373–75.

39

Id. at 1375.

40

Helsinn, 139 S. Ct. at 628, question presented report, No. 17-1229 (June 25, 2018).

41

Id. at 633.

42

Id.

43

525 U.S. 55 (1998).

44

See Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249 (1887); Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S.
126 (1878); Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92 (1877).

45

Helsinn, 139 S. Ct. at 633 (citing Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F. 3d 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2001), and Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F. 3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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States.46 The Court relied expressly on the Solicitor General’s argument that “if ‘on
sale’ had a settled meaning before the AIA was adopted, then adding the phrase ‘or
otherwise available to the public’ to the statute ‘would be a fairly oblique way of
attempting to overturn’ that ‘settled body of law.’”47 In reaching this conclusion the
Court rejected Helsinn’s argument, based on the “associated-words canon” of
legislative intent, that the effect of construing the statute as Teva advancedand
the Court acceptedwould read the amended words out of the statute. 48 The
opinion points out that the catch-all phrase “otherwise available to the public” is
better interpreted to capture “material that does not fit neatly into the statute’s
enumerated categories but is nevertheless meant to be covered”; “on-sale” having a
defined meaning the Court declined to encompass its proscriptions into what
constitutes being on-sale.49
The Court also, as can be its wont, waxed somewhat philosophical regarding the
limitations on Congressional authority for patenting (reproduced here as a sage
reminder of the underpinnings of much of the Court’s patent jurisprudence):
The United States Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Art. 1, §8, cl. 8. Under
this grant of authority, Congress has crafted a federal patent system that encourages
“the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in technology and
design” by granting inventors “the exclusive right to practice the invention for a period
of years.” Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151, 109 S.Ct. 971, 103
L.Ed.2d 118 (1989).
To further the goal of “motivating innovation and enlightenment” while also “avoiding
monopolies that unnecessarily stifle competition,” Pfaff, 525 U.S., at 63, 119 S.Ct. 304,
Congress has imposed several conditions on the “limited opportunity to obtain a
property right in an idea,” Bonito Boats, supra, at 149, 109 S.Ct. 971. One such condition is
the on-sale bar, which reflects Congress’ “reluctance to allow an inventor to remove
existing knowledge from public use” by obtaining a patent covering that knowledge.50

Congressman Lamar Smith, the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the

46

Id. at 633–34 (citing Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16 (1948)).

47

Id. at 634.

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Id. at 632–33. See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 64; see also Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, 19 (1829) (explaining
that “it would materially retard the progress of science and the useful arts" to allow an inventor to
“sell his invention publicly” and later “take out a patent” and “exclude the public from any farther
use than what should be derived under it”).
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U.S. House of Representatives during the pendency of the AIA, and the lead sponsor
of the bill in the House filed an amicus brief to the Court explaining Congressional
intent, which was unpersuasive to the Court.51
The Court’s language left the door slightly ajar for a future litigant to
distinguish this decision on different facts (for example, where there was no
disclosure that the agreement existed). The Court was uncharacteristically cautious
in its language (“a commercial sale to a third party who is required to keep the
invention confidential may place the invention ‘on sale’ under the AIA.”). 52
Congress, if sufficiently aggrieved by the Court’s dismissal of Congressman Smith’s
amicus brief explaining Congressional intent, could decide to include an express
provision into the statute overturning this decision. But it is clear that only
something that express will be enough to convince the Court that their own and the
Federal Circuit’s extensive jurisprudence has in fact been discarded by the changes
to U.S. patent law occasioned by passage of the AIA.
B. OSI Pharmaceuticals, LLC v. Apotex Inc. (Fed Cir. 2019)
The Federal Circuit overturned an obviousness determination in an inter partes
review (IPR) proceeding by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in OSI Pharmaceuticals
LLC v. Apotex Inc.53 The Court also reaffirmed its holdings in earlier-decided cases
that applying the IPR portion of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act to patents
arising from applications filed before enactment of the AIA is not
unconstitutional.54
The challenged patent, U.S. Patent No. 6,900,221, was listed in the Orange Book
for OSI’s cancer treatment Tarceva® (erlotinib), an epidermal growth factor
receptor (EGFR) inhibitor used in the treatment of non-small cell lung cancer
(NSCLC). 55 The opinion explains that NSCLC was the leading cause of cancer
deaths in 2000, amounting to greater than one million cases. 56 At that time,
chemotherapy was the standard therapy but was limited by the toxicity of most
cancer chemotherapeutic agents, which showed little specificity by killing normal

51

See Helsinn, 139 S. Ct. 628.

52

Id. at 630. (emphasis added).

53

939 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

54

Id. at 1385–86.

55

Id. at 1378.

56

Id. at 1377.
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as well as cancer cells.57
Efforts during the timeframe of the earliest claimed priority date of the ‘221
Patent were directed to EGFR inhibitors, butimportantly for the Court’s
decisionthe opinion notes that “many of these [EGFR inhibitors] failed in clinical
trials.”58 One reason for these negative outcomes, according to the opinion, is that
“[c]ancer treatment is highly unpredictable” and that while some promising
compounds were effective in vitro, such successes were “a poor proxy for how
effective that drug actually was in treating cancer in vivo (i.e., in the body)” (the
opinion cites several reasons for these results). 59 The opinion also recites the
regulatory hurdles prospective drugs must overcome, and that “[a] great majority of
therapies for NSCLC failed in clinical trials”including the 1631 new drugs for
treating NSCLC between 1990 and 2005, and the mere seven that were approved by
the FDA, one of which was OSI’s erlotinib.60
Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Petitioner challenged claims 4446
and 53 of the ‘221 Patent for being unpatentable as obvious:
44. A method for the treatment of NSCLC (non small cell lung cancer), pediatric
malignancies, cervical and other tumors caused or promoted by human papilloma virus
(H[P]V), Barrett’s esophagus (pre-malignant syndrome), or neoplastic cutaneous
diseases in a mammal comprising administering to said mammal a therapeutically
effective amount of a pharmaceutical composition comprised of at least one of N-(3ethynylphenyl)-6,7-bis(2-methoxyethoxy)-4-quinazolinamine, or pharmaceutically
acceptable salts thereof in anhydrous or hydrate forms, and a carrier.
45. The method of claim 44, wherein the treatment further comprises a palliative or
neoadjuvant/adjuvant monotherapy.
46. The method of claim 44, wherein the treatment further comprises blocking
epidermal growth factor receptors (EGFR).
53. The method of claim 44 for the treatment of non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC).61

The asserted prior art disclosed “a class of ‘4-(substituted phenylamino) quinazoline
derivatives which are useful in the treatment of hyperproliferative diseases, such as
cancers, in mammals” (Schnur); a scientific review article summarizing studies
related to cell signaling mechanisms and molecules like EGFR involved therein with
57

B.G. Peters, An overview of chemotherapeutic toxicities, Top Hosp Pharm Manage 14(2): 59-88
(1994).

58

OSI Pharmaceuticals, 939 F.3d at 1377.

59

Id. at 1377–78 (citing “poor pharmacokinetics due to poor absorption or rapid metabolism (or
both), undesirable drug-drug interactions, drug toxicity due to drug binding onto healthy cells,
drug toxicity due to binding onto other receptors, and metabolite toxicity”).
60

Id. at 1378.

61

OSI Pharmaceuticals, 939 F.3d at 1378–79.
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regard to malignant tumors (Gibbs); and OSI’s 10-K filing with the Security and
Exchange Commission. 62 Schnur discloses 105 different compounds including
erlotinib (a “preferred” compound) and that this compound could be used as a
treatment for cancers of many tissues, including lung (but not specifically
NSCLC).63 Gibbs discloses that erlotinib was in clinical development with “good
anti-cancer activity in preclinical models.” 64 The Gibbs reference discloses other
references that did not disclose erlotinib for use in treating NSCLC and had no data
regarding the use of erlotinib for treating NSCLC. 65 OSI’s 10-K discloses the
company’s efforts to obtain FDA approval of erlotinib for treating NSCLC (as well as
several other tumor types).66 This disclosure was limited to Phase I and Phase II
clinical trials and there were no clinical trial data in the document.67
The Board held that “a person of ordinary skill ‘would have combined Gibbs or
OSI 10-K with Schnur and had a reasonable expectation of success of achieving the
invention of challenged claims 44 and 53.”68 Specifically, the Board found that all the
limitations of claims 44 and 53 were disclosed in the Schnur reference except
treatment of NSCLC with erlotinib. This element of the claims was disclosed in
OSI’s 10-K or in the Gibbs disclosure that erlotinib “appear[s] to have good anticancer activity in preclinical models with an acceptable therapeutic index
particularly in patients with non-small cell lung cancer” (albeit without any
disclosure of clinical data to support these activities). 69 The Board entered
judgment in the IPR that claims 4446 and 53 were invalid for obviousness, and OSI
appealed.70
The Federal Circuit reversed, in an opinion by Judge Stoll, joined by Judges
Newman and Taranto. 71 While acknowledging that the Board’s factual findings
were due deferential “substantial evidence” review, citing Dickinson v. Zurko, “‘[m]ere

62

Id. at 1379–80.

63

Id. at 1379.

64

Id.

65

Id. at 1379–80.

66

Id. at 1380.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 1381.

69

OSI Pharmaceuticals, 939 F.3d at 1383 (emphasis omitted).

70

Id.

71

Id. at 1377.
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speculation’ is not substantial evidence” according to the opinion.72 The panel used
the District Court standard to illustrate that “substantial evidence is not a fixed
quantum of evidence, and may only be determined with respect to the standard of
proof”73 (although the relevance to the issue before the Court is not immediately
apparent). Nevertheless, the opinion states that “[t]he same point logically applies
to review of the Board’s finding.”74 Applying these standards, the panel held that the
Board’s finding was not supported by substantial evidence because:
As an initial matter, in reaching its conclusion, the Board misinterpreted the asserted
references to teach more than substantial evidence supports. When the references are
properly read, the Board’s finding that the asserted references provide a reasonable
expectation of success also is not supported by substantial evidence. To be clear, the
claims require only treatment of a mammal with erlotinib—efficacy in humans is not
required. But the asserted references do not disclose any data or other information
about erlotinib’s efficacy in treating NSCLC. The record does not contain any clinical
(human) data or pre-clinical (animal) data. It does not even include in vitro (test tube)
data regarding erlotinib’s effect on NSCLC. At the same time, it is undisputed that
NSCLC treatment was highly unpredictable with an over 99.5% rate of failure for drugs
entering Phase II clinical studies. On this record, we are not persuaded that a
reasonable factfinder could conclude that a person of ordinary skill would have
reasonably expected success based on the combination of Schnur and Gibbs or Schnur
and OSI’s 10-K.75

The opinion then sets out, for each reference, the deficiencies in the Board’s
understanding of the references and why alone or in combination they don’t
support an obviousness determination by substantial evidence. Gibbs, according to
the panel, is merely a review article with no independent data of its own, and the
data of others it does disclose does not include data showing that erlotinib could be
used to treat NSCLC.76 The references cited by Gibbs (who submitted a declaration
in support of patentee during the IPR) that disclosed erlotinib did not disclose its
use for treating NCSLC and the references disclosing NSCLC treatments did not
disclose erlotinib, according to the opinion.77
Turning to the question of whether the cited art would provide the required
reasonable expectation of success, the panel held that “properly read” the cited art

72

Id. at 1382 (citing Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999), and Intellectual Ventures I LLC
v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 870 F.3d 1320, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
73

Id. (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).

74

Id. (citing In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).

75

Id. at 1382–83 (emphasis in original).

76

OSI Pharmaceuticals, 939 F.3d at 1383–84.

77

Id.
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did not. 78 Regarding the combination of the Schnur and Gibbs references, “the
asserted references do not disclose any information about erlotinib’s efficacy in
treating NSCLC in a mammal,” according to the Court. 79 The Schnur reference
“fails to disclose any in vitro or in vivo efficacy data for erlotinib or otherwise suggest
the use of erlotinib to treat NSCLC”  and Gibbs, “[p]roperly read in context,[]
discloses only that erlotinib inhibits the EGFR and has good anticancer activity in
some cancers, not including NSCLC.”80 The absence of any data “or other promising
information regarding erlotinib’s efficacy in treating NSCLC,” combined with the
“highly unpredictable nature of treating NCSLC” precluded in the Court’s view
these references from providing the skilled worker with a reasonable expectation of
success regarding the claimed inventive methods.81
With regard to the combination of the Schnur reference and OSI’s 10-K
document, the Court found fault with the Board’s reliance on the existence of Phase
I and Phase II clinical trials in the 10-K documentagain without any data or
reference to data showing that erlotinib could successfully treat NSCLC. 82 The
panel also placed the Board’s reliance on the 10-K statements in the context of the
failure of 1630 putative EGFR-directed anti-cancer compounds (a 99.5% failure rate)
and faulted the Board for not considering this evidence when weighing the
reasonableness of any likelihood for success the 10-K disclosed information would
have had on the skilled artisan.83 “These references provide no more than hope—
and hope that a potentially promising drug will treat a particular cancer is not
enough to create a reasonable expectation of success in a highly unpredictable art
such as this,” according to the opinion.84
The United States intervened over OSI’s other grounds for appeal, questioning
the constitutionality of subjecting to inter partes review proceedings patents arising
from applications filed before passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.85
The opinion notes that only after oral argument in this case did the Federal Circuit
decide that applying IPR to pre-AIA patents is not a constitutional violation.86 In
78

Id. at 1384.

79

Id.

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

OSI Pharmaceuticals, 939 F.3d at 1385.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 1385–86.

86

Id. at 1386 (citing Celgene Corp. v. Peter, 931 F.3d 1342, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2019), and Arthrex, Inc.
v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 935 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2019)).
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the face of this precedent, OSI conceded and the panel entered judgment in
accordance with its earlier decisions that applying the IPR statute to pre-AIA
patents is not unconstitutional.87
C. *Amgen v Sandoz (en banc)
The latest chapter (and perhaps last) in the long-running dispute between
Amgen and Sandoz over Sandoz’s Zarxio® biosimilar to Amgen’s Neupogen®
biologic drug came to a close when the Federal Circuit affirmed grant of summary
judgment against Amgen in Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.88
To recap, Amgen’s Neupogen® product (filgrastim) is “a recombinant analog of
granulocyte-colony stimulating factor (‘G-CSF’), a naturally-occurring human
glycoprotein that stimulates the production of neutrophils and stem cells and their
release into the bloodstream.”89 It is used to treat patients with a deficiency of white
blood cells (neutropenia), typically caused by treatment with certain cancer
chemotherapeutic agents.90 In 2014, Sandoz filed an abbreviated biologic license
application (aBLA) under the provisions of §351(k) of the Public Health Service Act
(42 U.S.C. §262(k)) for approval of its Zarxio® biosimilar. 91 However, Sandoz
refused to comply with provisions of the Biologic Price Control and Innovation Act
(BPCIA) requiring a biosimilar applicant to disclose its application and any relevant
manufacturing information to reference product sponsor Amgen. 92 Amgen
brought suit but the District Court denied Amgen’s motion for preliminary
injunction, ruling that such disclosure was not mandatory.93 Amgen appealed to the
Federal Circuit, who in a fractured decision agreed with Sandoz.94 The Supreme

87

Id.

88

923 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

89

Id. at 1025.

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Order on Cross Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings and Denying Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 14-cv-04741-RS (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015); see also Andrew
Williams, Gotta Dance? Apparently Not – A Biosimilar Update, Patent Docs (Mar. 19, 2015),
https://www.patentdocs.org/2015/03/gotta-dance-apparently-not-a-biosimilar-update.html
[https://perma.cc/TS46-ZLUB].
94

Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see Kevin E. Noonan, Amgen v.
Sandoz (Fed. Cir. 2015), Patent Docs (July 22, 2015), https://www.patentdocs.org/2015/07/amgenv-sandoz-fed-cir-2015.html [https://perma.cc/Y27L-WRUD]; and Kevin E. Noonan, Federal Circuit
Decides Amgen v. Sandoz (in an opinion that will make neither party happy), Patent Docs (July 21,
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Court granted certiorari and also agreed with Sandoz.95 And upon remand to the
Federal Circuit, Amgen lost any chance of obtaining an injunction on the ground
that the state law claims (unfair competition among them) asserted by Amgen were
preempted by the BPCIA, which contained no provision for an injunction under
these circumstances. 96 During this time, the FDA had approved Zarxio® 97 and
Sandoz was marketing the Neupogen® biosimilar.98
Amgen pursued its patent case on the merits, asserting U.S. Patent Nos.
6,162,427 and 8,940,878. 99 The ‘427 Patent is directed to methods for treating
patients in need of peripheral stem cell transplantation; Amgen asserted claim 1 in
the District Court action:
1. A method of treating a disease requiring peripheral stem cell transplantation in a
patient in need of such treatment, comprising
administering to the patient a hematopoietic stem cell mobilizing-effective amount of
G-CSF; and
thereafter administering to the patient a disease treating-effective amount of at least
one chemotherapeutic agent.100

The ‘878 Patent is directed at protein purification methods using adsorbent
chromatography; claim 7 was at issue before the District Court:
7. A method of purifying a protein expressed in a non-native limited solubility form in
a non-mammalian expression system comprising:
(a) expressing a protein in a non-native limited solubility form in a non-mammalian
cell;
(b) lysing a non-mammalian cell;

2015),
https://www.patentdocs.org/2015/07/federal-circuit-decides-amgen-v-sandoz-in-anopinion-that-will-make-neither-party-happy.html [https://perma.cc/4B4C-36FF].
95

Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017); see Kevin E. Noonan & Andrew Williams,
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. (2017), Patent Docs (June 12, 2017), https://www.patentdocs.org/2017
/06/sandoz-inc-v-amgen-inc-2017.html [https://perma.cc/YR5T-EZLL].
96

Sandoz, 137 S. Ct. at 1669.

See Kevin E. Noonan, FDA Approves Sandoz Filgrastim Biosimilar, Patent Docs (Mar. 8, 2015),
https://www.patentdocs.org/2015/03/fda-approves-sandoz-filgrastim-biosimilar.html
[https://perma.cc/7KWA-P64A].
97

98

See Kevin E. Noonan, Sandoz' NEUPOGEN® Biosimilar Now on the Market, PATENT DOCS (Sept.
7, 2015), https://www.patentdocs.org/2015/09/sandoz-neupogen-biosimilar-now-on-the-market
.html [https://perma.cc/XPE9-CPBJ].
99

Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 14-CV-04741-RS, 2016 WL 4137563, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2016)
(deciding U.S. Patent No. 8,940,878 (filed June 24, 2010); U.S. Patent No. 6,162,427 (filed Nov. 12,
1998).
100

Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1026 (reviewing ‘427 Patent).
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(c) solubilizing the expressed protein in a solubilization solution comprising one or
more of the following:
(i) a denaturant;
(ii) a reductant; and
(iii) a surfactant;
(d) forming a refold solution comprising the solubilization solution and a refold buffer,
the refold buffer comprising one or more of the following:
(i) a denaturant;
(ii) an aggregation suppressor;
(iii) a protein stabilizer; and
(iv) a redox component;
(e) directly applying the refold solution to a separation matrix under conditions suitable
for the protein to associate with the matrix;
(f) washing the separation matrix; and
(g) eluting the protein from the separation matrix, wherein the separation matrix is a
non-affinity resin selected from the group consisting of ion exchange, mixed mode, and
a hydrophobic interaction resin.101

Central to the issues on appeal was the District Court’s claim construction where
the Court construed “disease treating-effective amount of at least one
chemotherapeutic agent” in claim 1 of the ‘427 Patent to be limited to “[a]n amount
sufficient to treat a disease for which at least one chemotherapeutic agent is
prescribed.” The Court thereby rejected Amgen’s asserted construction that the
amount must be merely sufficient to mobilize stem cells regardless of its effect on
the underlying disease.102 Under this construction, Amgen stipulated Sandoz did
not infringe claim 1 of the ‘427 Patentpending appeal to the Federal Circuit.103
The District Court construed the terms relating to the “washing” and “eluting”
steps of the method claimed in the ‘878 Patent specifically, subparts (f) and (g)) as
being separate steps that required the washing step to be performed before the
eluting step.104 Again, under this construction Amgen conceded it could not prevail
on infringement because Sandoz performed these steps concurrently with step (e)
(regarding application of the refolding solution).105 This appeal followed.
The Federal Circuit affirmed, in an opinion by Judge Lourie joined by Judges

101

Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1026.

102

Id. at 1027.

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Id.
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O’Malley and Reyna.106 Regarding construction of the claims of the ‘878Patent, the
panel credited Sandoz’s argument that the claim “logically requires a series of
steps,” citing (as did Sandoz) Mformation Technologies, Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd.107
The Federal Circuit, like the District Court, rejected Amgen’s argument that
washing and eluting could be performed simultaneously, for example, under
circumstances where “washing may occur toward the bottom of the matrix at the
same time that elution occurs toward the top.”108 The Court’s reasoning was based
in part on the ordered (and sequentially lettered) steps (a) through (g), which
“logically” implies they be performed in sequence.109 This ordered performance of
the steps was also consistent with how the process was described in the
specification.110
Having determined that the District Court’s construction was correct as a
matter of law (and thus that Sandoz process did not literally infringe claim 7 of the
‘878 Patent, the Federal Circuit then considered infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. 111 Using language that arguably was at least in part responsible for
energizing the Supreme Court to review more closely the Federal Circuit’s
stewardship of the Court’s patent jurisprudence (inter alia, in Warner-Jenkinson v.
Hilton Davis Chemical Co. and Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.
almost a generation ago), 112 the panel dismissed Amgen’s doctrine of equivalents
argument. The panel stated “[t]he doctrine of equivalents applies only in exceptional
cases and is not ‘simply the second prong of every infringement charge, regularly
available to extend protection beyond the scope of the claims.’”113 More correctly
(and less provocatively), the panel based its decision on the sound reasoning that
“Sandoz does not infringe claim 7 under the doctrine of equivalents because its onestep, one-solution purification process works in a substantially different way from

106

Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1024.

107

Id. at 1028 (citing Information Technologies, Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392,
1398–1400 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("a process claim is properly limited to a certain order of steps 'when the
claim language, as a matter of logic or grammar, requires that the steps be performed in the order
written, or the specification directly or implicitly requires' an order of steps.")).

108

Id. at 1028–29.

109

Id.

110

Id.

111

Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1029.

112

See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Festo Corp., 344 F.3d
at 1359.
113

Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1029 (citing its pre-Warner Jenkinson precedent in London v. Carson
Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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the claimed three-step, three-solution process” recited in Amgen’s claims.114
The opinion also rejected Amgen’s argument that the District Court abused its
discretion in not denying or postponing summary judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(d) because Sandoz “intends” (undisputedly), sometime in an
uncertain future, to change its purification protocol to (perhaps) an infringing one
but has provided neither Amgen nor the FDA with details of its plans.115 As the Court
held in Sunovion Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., while district courts cannot
ignore amendments to ANDA or aBLA applications in determining whether there is
(artificial) infringement under §271(e)(2), they also have “a broad mandate to
render a ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive’ decision.” 116 The opinion discounted
Amgen’s argument that failure to postpone judgment would deny them of a remedy
if Sandoz changed its process to an infringing one, on the grounds that Amgen
could pursue a remedy for infringement to the extent that principles of res judicata
and collateral estoppel were not violated, citing Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp.117 Under the
circumstances before the Court in this case (particularly because the possible
changes Sandoz might make would still not result in an infringing process), the
Federal Circuit held the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
postpone entry of summary judgment.118 This aspect of the decision highlights a
disparity in information first encountered when Sandoz refused to disclose either
its aBLA or manufacturing information under Paragraph 2 of the BPCIA (42 U.S.C.
§262 (l)(2)).119 The District Court (expressly), the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme
Court evinced their presumption that all requisite information could be obtained
during discovery in an ensuing lawsuit (disregarding the disadvantage their
interpretation of the statute propagated regarding which patent(s) a reference
product sponsor such as Amgen should sue on in the absence of this information).120
Again, here, the Federal Circuit presumed that Amgen will be able to obtain the
information necessary to file a well-pleaded complaint in the event Sandoz begins
practicing an infringing version of its purification method. The court’s
114

Id.

115

Id. at 1029–30.

116

Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1030; see Sunovion Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 1271,
1279–80 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing In re Micron Tech., Inc., 875 F.3d 1091, 1100 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting
Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2016)).

117

Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1031; see Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp., 279 F.3d 1340, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
118

Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1031.

119

Id. at 1025.

120

Sandoz Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664; Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1023; Amgen Inc., 2016 WL 4137563 at *1.
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presumption did not address Amgen’s argument that there is a possibility that they
will not have and will not be able to obtain the information, under circumstances
where the Court had at least some leverage to obtain binding representations from
Sandoz that this information would be made available should that time come.121
Turning to the ‘427 Patent, the panel also affirmed the District Court’s
construction of the term “disease treating-effective amount of at least one
chemotherapeutic agent” to be limited to “an amount sufficient to treat a disease
for which at least one chemotherapeutic agent is prescribed.”122 The Federal Circuit
rejected Amgen’s argument that the amount need not be effective to treat the
underlying disease but only be sufficient to mobilize stem cells in blood or bone
marrow.123 The opinion based this construction on the preamble (“[a] method of
treating a disease”) and (according to the Court) “neither the claim nor the
specification lends support to Amgen’s interpretation.” 124 Under Amgen’s
construction, the claim would encompass activities directed solely at mobilizing
stem cells, which would require the “disease treatment” to correspond to stem cell
mobilization per se.125 There is no basis for this interpretation in the panel’s view,
and thus the Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.126
Four months later, the Federal Circuit issued an order modifying its opinion to
read: “The doctrine of equivalents applies only in exceptional cases and is not
‘simply the second prong of every infringement charge, regularly available to extend
protection beyond the scope of the claims,’” thus removing the Court’s latest
provocation of the Supreme Court.127
D. Ajinomoto v. ITC
The Federal Circuit again reviewed a determination of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents, in this instance by the International Trade Commission
(ITCagain finding that one of the Supreme Court’s exceptions to the preclusive
effects of prosecution history estoppel (the “tangential relationship” test) applied

121

Amgen Inc., 923 F.3d at 1031.
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Id. at 1027.
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Id.
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Id. at 1031–32.
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Order on Petition for Panel Rehearing, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 2018-1551 (Fed. Cir.
2019).
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and affirmed the ITC’s finding of infringement under the doctrine.128
Ajinomoto petitioned the ITC under Section 337 (19 U.S.C. §1337) for an
exclusion order against CJ Cheiljedang for importing animal feed-grade Ltryptophan amino acid products produced by several different strains of Escherichia
coli, which Ajinimoto alleged infringed its U.S. Patent No. 7,666,655.129 The relevant
claim of the ‘655 Patent (claim 20) is directed to “method[s] for producing an
aromatic L-amino acid, which comprises cultivating the bacterium according to any
one of claims 9–12, 13, 14, 15–18, or 19.”130 With regard to the claimed bacteria, claims
9 and 15 are relevant to the Commission’s (and the Court’s) decision:
9. A recombinant Escherichia coli bacterium, which has the ability to accumulate
aromatic L-amino acid in a medium, wherein the aromatic L-amino acid production by
said bacterium is enhanced by enhancing activity of a protein in a cell of said bacterium
beyond the levels observed in a wild-type of said bacterium,
[1] and in which said protein consists of the amino acid sequence of SEQ ID NO: 2
[2] and said protein has the activity to make the bacterium resistant to Lphenylalanine, fluoro-phenylalanine or 5[-]fluoro-DL-tryptophan,
[3] wherein the activity of the protein is enhanced by [3a] transformation of the
bacterium with a DNA encoding the protein to express the protein in the
bacterium, [3b] by replacing the native promoter which precedes the DNA on the
chromosome of the bacterium with a more potent promoter, [3c] or by introduction
of multiple copies of the DNA encoding said protein into the chromosome of said
bacterium to express the protein in said bacterium.131

Claim 15 differs from claim 9 with regard to the protein limitation [1], wherein the
protein is limited by nucleotide sequence encoding the amino acid sequence rather
claim being limited by the amino acid sequence per se; important to the Court’s
decision is that claim 15 limits the species of nucleotide sequences to those that
hybridize to the sequence corresponding to the amino acid sequence under
specified hybridization conditions.132
The claimed bacteria have been genetically engineered to increase L-aromatic
amino acid production by fermentation and in particular production of Ltryptophan.133 The basis for this increased production depends on an E. coli gene,

128

Ajinomoto Co. v. USITC, 932 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

129

Id. at 1345 (reviewing U.S. Patent No. 7,666,655 (filed Nov. 25, 2002)).

130

Id. at 1346.

131

Id. at 1346–47 (boldface numbers were added by the Court in the opinion).

132

Id. at 1347.

133

Ajinomoto, 932 F.3d at 1346.

293

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

19:2 (2021)

yddG, that encodes the YddG protein. 134 This protein is an aromatic amino acid
transporter that causes the bacteria to excrete these amino acids into the culture
medium.135 This is achieved in one of three ways: either by introducing (via plasmid
transduction) additional copies of the gene into the bacteria ([3a]); integrating
additional copies of this gene into the bacterial chromosome ([3b]); or using a
transcriptionally “stronger” promoter to express the endogenous yddG gene ([3c]).136
After an investigation, the Commission found that there were three groups of
E. coli strains that CJ used to make the imported product:
“[E]arlier strains” contained both the native E. coli yddG gene and the native E. coli yddG
promoter, except that the first nucleotide of the promoter was changed through
chemical mutagenesis, resulting in a stronger promoter . . . a first “later strain,” which
contained two copies of a yddG gene: (1) the native E. coli yddG gene with the native E.
coli yddG promoter; and (2) a non-E. coli yddG gene with two promoters—(2a) a native
non-E. coli yddG promoter and (2b) an rmf promoter . . . [and a] second “later strain”
which also contained two copies of a yddG gene: (1) the native E. coli yddG gene with the
native E. coli yddG promoter; and (2) a codon-randomized non-E. coli yddG gene with two
promoters—(2a) an rmf promoter and (2b) an rhtB promoter[; the latter two of these
strains first having been used after Ajinomoto brought its complaint].137

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) made a final initial determination where
the phrase, “replacing the native promoter . . . with a more potent promoter” was
construed to mean “removing the native upstream region of the yddG gene and
inserting one of a class of promoters that controls expression of a different gene.”138
Under this construction, the ALJ held that the claims of the ‘655 Patent were invalid
for failure to satisfy the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. §112(a) and
that the imported products did not infringe the ‘655 Patent claims, either literally or
under the doctrine of equivalents.139 The full Commission reviewed this decision,
affirming the ALJ’s claim construction and determination of noninfringement of
the imported products made by the earlier strain, and reversing as to the invalidity
determination and infringement for products made using the later strains under
the doctrine of equivalents. 140 An exclusion order as to the latter two products
ensued and this appeal followed.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s decision in an opinion by Judge
134

Id.
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Ajinomoto Co., 932 F.3d at 1346.
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Id. at 1347–48.
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Id. at 1348.
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Ajinomoto Co., 932 F.3d at 1348.
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Taranto joined in full by Judge Moore; Judge Dyk concurred in part and dissented
in part. Beginning with the Commission’s claim construction, the panel
unanimously affirmed that construction and rejected Ajinomoto’s argument that
the term “encompasses mutagenesis of individual nucleotides within the native
promoter” rather than being limited to replacement of the native promoter with a
“stronger” one. 141 The Court found that this construction was supported by the
ordinary and customary meaning of the claim language.142 The opinion asserts that
“context matters,” stating that “[i]n many contexts, one would not refer to swapping
out one small component of a larger unit as ‘replacing’ the unit or as providing a
‘substitute’ for the unit, even though the net result is a differently constituted larger
unit.”143 This interpretation is consistent with the disclosure in the specification of
the ‘655 Patent, which tellingly does not recite the term “replacing” but does recite
the word “substituting,” which the Court held was consistent with the
Commission’s construction of the phrase.144 And nothing in the prosecution history
was to the contrary. 145 The opinion recapped the course of prosecution
amendments and argument relevant to the construction, saying that even though
patent applicants may have restricted the scope of their claims to a greater extent
than necessary, “there is no principle of patent law that the scope of a surrender of
subject matter during prosecution is limited to what is absolutely necessary to avoid
a prior art reference that was the basis for an examiner’s rejection.”146 Applying this
principle to rejections under §112, the Court affirmed the Commission’s
construction.
Turning to the Commission’s infringement determinations, the panel agreed
that imported product made from CJ’s earlier strain did not infringe (either literally
or under the doctrine of equivalents) but split on whether product made using
either of the later strains infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. 147 With

141

Id.
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Id. at 1349 (using as examples of "replacing" an object "a laptop computer, a bicycle, a sailboat,
a blender," comprising an interesting Markush group).

143

Id. at 1349.
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Id. (even reciting in an express example that the promoters were substituted).
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Id.
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See Ajinomoto Co., 932 F.3d at 1351 (citing Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 432 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed.
Cir. 2005); Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 713 F.3d 1090, 1095–96 (Fed. Cir. 2013)); see
also Donald Zuhn, Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC (Fed. Cir. 2013), Patent Docs (April 17,
2013)), https://www.patentdocs.org/2013/04/biogen-idec-inc-v-glaxosmithkline-llc-fed-cir-2013.
html [https://perma.cc/569L-6C82].
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Id. at 1348, 1352; see id. at 1361 (Dyk, J., concurring in part).
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regard to the second of the two later strains, the Commission had “found that the
YddG protein encoded by the codon-randomized non-E. coli yddG gene of this strain
is an equivalent of SEQ ID NO:2” recited in claim 9.148 CJ challenged this ruling on
two grounds: that the amendments made during prosecution raised an estoppel
against infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and that the protein
expressed in CJ’s second strain failed to satisfy the “structure-way-result” rationale
for infringement under the doctrine.149 Citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., the majority recognized three exceptions to the scope of prosecution
history estoppel, with the second of these (that “the rationale underlying the
amendment may bear no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in
question”) being dispositive to the issue before the Court. 150 The basis for the
majority’s view is that during prosecution, patentees made an amendment to
distinguish over prior art that narrowed the scope of the claim from alternatives to
the protein having an amino acid sequence identified as SEQ ID NO: 2 that differed
by “deletion, substitution, insertion, or addition of several amino acids.” 151 The
amendment changed the claim language to recite instead “a protein which
comprises an amino acid sequence that is encoded by a nucleotide sequence that
hybridizes with the nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO:1 under stringent
conditions.”152 The majority considered the circumstances “unusual” because “the
original claim provided two alternatives; only the second was modified by
amendment; and only the first is asserted as the basis for infringement by CJ’s
second later strain.” 153 The standard to apply in determining whether the
“tangential relationship” test is adequate to rebut the estoppel “focuses on the
patentee’s objectively apparent reason for the narrowing amendment.” 154 The
majority held that Ajinomoto had satisfied this standard:
The objectively evident rationale for the amendment was to limit the set of proteins
within the claim’s scope so that it no longer included the prior-art E. coli YfiK protein
and, more generally, no longer allowed as wide a range of amino acid alterations (hence
changes in the protein) as original alternative (B), which had allowed “deletion,
substitution, insertion or addition of one or several amino acids in the amino acid

148

Id. at 1352 (majority opinion).

149

Id.

150

Id. at 1353–56 (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740
(2002)).

151

Id. at 1353.

152

Ajinomoto Co., 932 F.3d at 1353.

153

Id.

154

Id. at 1354.
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sequence shown in SEQ ID NO: 2.” . . . The reason for the amendment had nothing to
do with choosing among several DNA sequences in the redundant genetic code that
correspond to the same protein.155 Indeed, it was undisputed that the non-E. coli YddG
protein produced without codon randomization remains within the literal claim scope
even after the amendment and that the non-E. coli YddG protein is identical whether
produced from the codon randomized or the non-codon-randomized version of the
non-E. coli yddG gene.156

“Accordingly,” according to the opinion, “the reason for the narrowing
amendmentlimiting the amino-acid makeup of the proteins included in one of
the alternatives covered by the claimis unrelated to differences among the several
DNA sequences that encode a given protein.”157
Regarding CJ’s second ground of appeal, the majority further found that the
non-E. coli YddG protein of CJ’s second later strain satisfied the “structure-wayresult” test for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents compared to the
claimed E. coli YddG protein.158 This conclusion was supported by expert testimony
as to the function of the two proteins (as “‘export protein[s] that actively export[]
aromatic L-amino acids and aromatic L-amino acid analogs’ out of the bacterial
cell”), as was the “way” prong of the test (based on the 85-95% identical structure
of the two proteins and the result (that the consequence of the biochemical activity
of each protein was for L-tryptophan to accumulate extracellularly).159 The majority
also rejected CJ’s contention that its strains did not become “resistant” to Ltryptophan (i.e., could grow in its absence) based on CJ‘s own fermentation
evidence. 160 The majority found no error in any of these conclusions and thus
affirmed the Commission’s conclusion that the product produced by CJ’s two later
bacterial strains infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.161
Finally, the panel unanimously held that asserted claim 20 of the ‘655 Patent was
not invalid for failure to satisfy the written description requirement.162 The panel
found that patentees had disclosed a “representative number” of stronger
promoters and the person of ordinary skill would be cognizant of other members of
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Id. at 1355 (citation omitted).
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Id.
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Ajinomoto Co., 932 F.3d at 1355.

158

Id. at 1356.
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Ajinomoto Co., 932 F.3d at 1356.

160

Id. at 1356–57.
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Id.
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Id. at 1358; see also id. at 1361 (Dyk, J., concurring in part).
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this group from, inter alia, prior art disclosures thereof. 163 “[T]he genus of more
potent promoters was already well explored in the relevant art by the time of the ‘655
Patent’s invention. In these circumstances, the Commission permissibly found in
the specification, read in light of the background knowledge in the art, a
representative number of species for the genus of more potent promoters,”
according to the panel.164
Judge Dyk’s dissent was limited to the application of the tangential relationship
exception to preclude prosecution history estoppel from negating infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents.165 For Judge Dyk, the amendments to the claims
of the ‘655 Patent had a direct relationship to the elements at issue (non-E. coli YddG
protein of CJ’s second later strain and thus L-tryptophan produced by either of CJ’s
later two bacterial strains did not infringe under the doctrine.166
E. *iNo Therapeutics LLC v. Praxair Distribution Inc.
Albert Einstein once famously (albeit perhaps apocryphally) said that “the
power of compound interest is the most powerful force in the universe.”167 Not to
contradict the creator of 20th Century physics, but it is just as likely that the most
powerful force in the universe is the power of unintended consequences. The
Federal Circuit illustrated this power in its decision in iNo Therapeutics LLC v. Praxair
Distribution Inc. with regard to Justice Breyer’s exhortation in his Mayo Collaborative
Serv. Inc. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. opinion, regarding the need to beware of
“interpreting patent statutes in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on
the draftsman’s art’ without reference to the ‘principles underlying the prohibition
against patents for [natural laws].’”168
Plaintiffs iNO Therapeutics, LLC Mallinckrodt Hospital Products Inc and
Mallinckrodt Hospital Products IP Inc. asserted U.S. Patent Nos. 8,282,966;
8,293,284; 8,795,741; 8,431,163; and 8,846,112, which the opinion “collectively [termed
the] ‘heart failure patents’ or ‘HF patents’” against Praxair Distribution Inc. and
163

Id. at 1358–59 (majority opinion) (four, exactly: PL promoter of lambda phage, the lac
promoter, the trp promoter, and the trc promoter).

164

Id. at 1359.

165

Ajinomoto Co., 932 F.3d at 1361 (Dyk, J., concurring in part).

166

Id. at 1361–63.

Allan Roth, Compound Interest – The Most Powerful Force in the Universe?, CBS News (June 7, 2011,
9:48 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/compound-interest-the-most-powerful-force-in-theuniverse/ [https://perma.cc/7X4E-Z6TX].
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566 U.S. 66, 73 (2012) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978); see generally 782 Fed. Appx.
1001 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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Praxair Inc. 169 Plaintiffs also asserted U.S. Patent Nos. 8,573,209; 8,776,794;
8,776,795; 9,265,911; and 9,295,802, which the opinion “collectively [termed the]
‘delivery system infrared patents’ or ‘DSIR patents’” and which were directed to
devices for administering nitric oxide gas.170 As explained in the opinion, inhaled
nitric oxide (iNO) gas had been “used to treat infants experiencing hypoxic
respiratory failure” since at least the early 1990’s.171 However, in certain cases this
treatment results in increased pulmonary edema for infants having a congenital
defect, left ventricular hypertrophy. 172 The patents-in-suit were directed to
methods and a gas delivery device to ameliorate this side-effect, as exemplified by
the following claims:
Claim 1 of the ‘741 Patent:
1. A method of treating patients who are candidates for inhaled nitric oxide
treatment, which method reduces the risk that inhalation of nitric oxide gas will
induce an increase in pulmonary capillary wedge pressure (PCWP) leading to
pulmonary edema in neonatal patients with hypoxic respiratory failure, the
method comprising: (a) identifying a plurality of term or near-term neonatal
patients who have hypoxic respiratory failure and are candidates for 20 ppm
inhaled nitric oxide treatment; (b) determining that a first patient of the plurality
does not have left ventricular dysfunction; (c) determining that a second patient of
the plurality has left ventricular dysfunction, so is at particular risk of increased
PCWP leading to pulmonary edema upon treatment with inhaled nitric oxide; (d)
administering 20 ppm inhaled nitric oxide treatment to the first patient; and (e)
excluding the second patient from treatment with inhaled nitric oxide, based on the
determination that the second patient has left ventricular dysfunction, so is at particular
risk of increased PCWP leading to pulmonary edema upon treatment with inhaled
nitric oxide.173

And claim of the ‘794 Patent:
1. A gas delivery device comprising:
a gas source to provide therapy gas comprising nitric oxide;
a valve attachable to the gas source, the valve including an inlet and an outlet in
169

iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. at 1002; see also U.S. Patent No. 8,846,112 (filed Nov. 21, 2012);
U.S. Patent No. 8,795,741 (filed Nov. 21, 2012); U.S. Patent No. 8,431,163 (filed Oct. 15, 2012); U.S.
Patent No. 8,293,284 (filed June 22, 2010); U.S. Patent No. 8,282,966 (filed June 22, 2010).
170

iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. at 1002; see also U.S. Patent No. 9,295,802 (filed Feb. 24, 2015);
U.S. Patent No. 9,265,911 (filed Oct. 29, 2013); U.S. Patent No. 8,776,795 (filed Oct. 29, 2013); U.S.
Patent No. 8,776,794 (filed Oct. 29, 2013); U.S. Patent No. 8,573,209 (filed Jan. 6, 2011).
171

iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. at 1002.

172

Id. at 1002–03.
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fluid communication and a valve actuator to open or close the valve to allow the gas
through the valve to a control module that delivers the therapy gas comprising
nitric oxide in an amount effective to treat or prevent hypoxic respiratory failure;
and
a circuit including:
a memory to store gas data comprising one or more of gas identification, gas
expiration date and gas concentration; and
a processor and a transceiver in communication with the memory to send and
receive signals to communicate the gas data to the control module that controls gas
delivery to a subject and to verify one or more of the gas identification, the gas
concentration and that the gas is not expired.174

The opinion also notes that the Court had earlier affirmed the PTAB’s invalidation
of the ‘112 Patent in inter partes review.175 The District Court held the claims of the
HF patents to be directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101
and that Praxair did not infringe the claims of the DSIR patents.176 Mallinckrodt
appealed.
The Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part, vacated-in-part, and remanded, in an
opinion by Chief Judge Prost joined by Judge Dyk; Judge Newman concurredin
part and dissentedinpart (but the thrust of her opinion dissented from the
majority’s routine and now conventional, but not capable of being well-understood,
affirmance that the claims were not eligible for patenting under §101).177 The Court
applied its now well-worn (and unnecessarily expansive) interpretation of the
Supreme Court’s Mayo/Alice test in affirming the District Court.178 Dissecting the
claims in furtherance of its patent-invalidating efforts, the panel majority first
states that:
It is undisputed that treatment of infants experiencing hypoxic respiratory failure with
iNO gas has existed for decades. The inventors observed an adverse event that iNO gas
causes for certain patients. The patent claim does no more than add an instruction to
withhold iNO treatment from the identified patients; it does not recite giving any
affirmative treatment for the iNO-excluded group, and so it covers a method in which,
for the iNO-excluded patients, the body’s natural processes are simply allowed to take
place. Consequently, the claim here is directed to the natural phenomenon. The claim,
174

iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. at 1003–04 (where the italicized limitations are relevant to
the Court’s decision).

175

Id. at 1002 (citing Praxair Distribution, Inc. v. Mallinckrodt Hospital Products IP Ltd., 890
F.3d 1024, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); see also id. at 1015 n. 1 (Newman, J., concurring in part) (citing
Praxair Distribution, 890 F.3d 1024).
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Id. at 1004 (majority opinion).
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See generally iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. 1001.
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Id. at 1005.
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apart from the natural phenomenon itself, involves only well-understood, routine, and
conventional steps. For the reasons below, claim 1 of the ‘741 [P]atent fails to recite
eligible subject matter.179

What follows is the majority’s justification for this conclusion. The natural
phenomenon is “undisputed” (because the majority defines it as such), the majority
saying “[a] neonate patient’s body will react to iNO gas in a certain way depending
on whether or not the patient has a congenital heart condition called LVD,” followed
by a recitation of the consequences thereof.180 The panel majority then parsed the
claim language to find that the claims are “directed to” an observation of the natural
phenomenon they have defined, because the exclusion (from treatment) step
“merely restates the natural law” (nature it seems providing a caregiver who can give
the gas as well as knowing without benefit of the invention when to refrain from
giving it).181 According to the majority:
Properly understood, this added step [characterized by Mallinckrodt as an “exclusion”
step] is simply an instruction not to act. In effect, the claim is directed to detecting the
presence of LVD in a patient and then doing nothing but leaving the natural processes
taking place in the body alone for the group of LVD patients. Accordingly, the claim is
directed to the natural phenomenon.182

And to avoid any correspondence with Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward
Pharmaceuticals International Ltd.,183 the majority asserted:
Indeed, Mallinckrodt cannot dispute that the patented method does not propose a new
way of treating LVD patients that leverages this discovery (e.g., by titrating the iNO
dose).184 Instead, the claim simply requires that the patient not be treated with iNO.
This is significant because a claim not to treat—i.e., not to disturb these naturallyoccurring physiological processes within the LVD patient’s body—risks monopolizing
the natural processes themselves.185

And returning to the opinion’s theme:
A closer look at the claim language as a whole confirms that the focus of the invention
is not on a new way of actually treating the underlying condition of hypoxic respiratory
failure. Nor does it recite a way of reducing the risk of pulmonary edema while
providing some level of treatment to those patients. Rather, the focus of the invention is

179

Id.

180

Id. at 1005–06.

181

See id. at 1006.
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Id.
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See 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. at 1006.
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Id. at 1006–07 (citing Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d 743, 752
(Fed. Cir. 2019)).
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screening for a particular adverse condition that, once identified, requires iNO
treatment be withheld. A treatment step of administering a prior art dosage is also
present. But that step is plainly not the focus of the claimed invention. Mallinckrodt
concedes this step is not innovative. Mallinckrodt does not point to “any innovation
other than its [purported] discovery of the natural law.”186

The opinion also cites Nat. Alternatives Int’l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, and Endo
Pharm. Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., in support of the majority’s distinction between
these claims and what it considers “method of treatment” claims. 187 The panel
further distinguished these claims from the patent-eligible claims in Rapid Litigation
Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., (a decision also written by the Chiefagain on
the grounds of “a careful reading of the claim language” in those claims and these.188
With regard to the second step of the Mayo/Alice test, the panel majority rejected
Mallinckrodt’s argument that the claims possess an “inventive concept.” 189
Following their wont, the majority found nothing sufficiently novel to warrant
satisfaction of the second step inquiry.190 It is a tribute to the essential blurring of
statutory lines engendered by Justice Breyer’s Mayo decision191 that the discussion
revolves expressly on lack of novelty in performing the eligibility analysis 192
Understandably, the majority took frank recourse to what they perceive to be the
parallels between these claims and the claims in Mayo to support their decision. And
the majority characterized as a “red herring” Mallinckrodt’s contentions that their
claims do not entirely preempt the putative natural phenomenon, surprising in
view of the role preemption plays in justifying the Supreme Court’s eligibility
requirements in the first place.193
The majority’s consideration of infringement of the DSIR patents is more
186

iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. at 1006–07 (citing Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo
Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d 743, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2019)).
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Id. at 1008 (citing Nat. Alternatives Int'l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 918 F.3d 1338 (Fed.
Cir. 2019); Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 919 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019)).
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Id. at 1008–09 (citing Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042
(Fed. Cir. 2016)).
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Id. at 1010–11.
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Id. at 1011.
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Albeit much less understandable or forgivable when the nation’s “patent court” does so.
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For example, the opinion states: “[t]his would be quite a different case if the inventors had
invented a new way of titrating the dose” and, citing the District Court (which doesn’t take a
putatively specialized appellate court to do), “[p]laintiffs cannot seriously contend that it is a new
practice to exclude certain patients from treatment with a drug when those patients are at an
increased risk of experiencing negative side effects from the drug.” See id. at 1011–12.
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legally conventional involving Mallinckrodt’s disagreement with the District
Court’s construction of the term “verify” in the phrase “verify one or more of the gas
identification, the gas concentration  and that the gas is not expired.” 194 The
majority correctly noted that the District Court didn’t formally construe the word
giving it its plain and ordinary meaning. 195 The opinion characterizes this
argument as Mallinckrodt “attempt[ing] to undo its loss on infringement by
redrawing the metes and bounds of the claim” and finds this effort “unavailing.”196
Providing one basis for Judge Newman to agree with her colleagues, the
opinion reversed a “technical error” by the District Court and remanded for
correction of the Court’s “clerical error” (specifically, issuing a “blanket” judgment
on all the claims of the asserted patents rather than limiting it to the asserted
claims).197
Judge Newman’s dissent is directed to the eligibility portion of the decision. In
her view, the inventors observed a natural phenomenon and then developed a
treatment method that took advantage of that observation to avoid adverse
events.198 “The method that is described and claimed does not exist in nature; it was
designed by and is administered by humans” as the Judge saw things. 199
Procedurally, Judge Newman faults her colleagues because “[t]he majority
improperly separates the claims into old and new steps, describes some claim steps
as a ‘natural phenomenon’ and some steps as ‘well-understood, routine, and
conventional steps,’ and avoids the requirement that a claimed invention is
considered as a whole.”200 And “[t]oday’s change of law adds to the inconsistency
and unpredictability of this area of patent-supported innovation.” 201 In Judge
Newman’s view, “the majority’s ruling conflicts with extensive precedent” (which
she extensively cites) as well as “the national interest”:202
The majority [states that] “we emphasize the narrowness of our holding today, which is
limited to the particular claims at issue and is driven by the particular circumstances
here.” This disclaimer appears at the end of a lengthy exposition, whose wide-ranging
pronouncements of law and policy are not tied to narrow circumstances or claims. The
194

Id.
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Id. at 1013.
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iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. at 1014; see also id. (Newman, J., concurring in part).
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persistent theme of the majority’s analysis is that if a claim contains limitations that
concern human physiology, ineligibility arises under section 101, whether or not the
claimed method of medical treatment meets the requirement of patentability.203

Judge Newman further opined that the majority’s broad pronouncement of
ineligibility of medical treatment that relates to human physiology not only
contravened precedent but contravened the national interest in achieving new
methods of medical treatment with the assistance of the patent incentive.204
Reaching back more than two centuries, Judge Newman reminded her
colleagues that patents do not function to “impede scientific and technological
advance,” citing Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813 based
on common law and statutory research exemptions, citing her dissent in Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2003 and Giles
Sutherland Rich in Principles of Patentability, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 393, 400 (1960) (“It
should never be forgotten that patented inventions are published and become a part
of the technical literature. This publication itself promotes progress in the useful
arts and it is the prospect of patent rights which induces disclosure and the issuance
of the patent which makes it available.”).”205
The majority’s blessedly non-precedential opinion will bring cold comfort to
patent-divested patentees to the extent it leads patent prosecutors to the inevitable
conclusion that the Federal Circuit is counseling exactly what Justice Breyer
cautioned against in Mayoto beware of the clever draftsman who attempts (or
worse, succeeds) in obtaining claims based predominantly on such claim-drafting
cleverness.206 This is not the first time that this has been the outcome of the Federal
Circuit’s patent eligibility jurisprudence. For example, in In re Roslin, Judge Dyk’s
opinion held patent-ineligible claims to Dolly the sheep which was, after all, just a
sheep (notwithstanding being a sheep unlike any sheep that had ever lived).207 But
a careful review of that opinion leads ineluctably to the conclusion that had the
draftsman been clever enough (or prescient enough to realize before the fact the
quantum and quality of cleverness required) to have claimed a flock of genetically
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Id. at 1017.
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iNO Therapeutics, 782 Fed. Appx. at 1017–18 (Newman, J., concurring in part) (citing Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting));
Giles Sutherland Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 393, 400 (1960)).
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Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 69 (2013) (citing
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)).
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See In re Roslin Inst. (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333, 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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identical sheep, the Court’s objections to patent ineligibility would have perforce
fallen, because it would be undeniable that flocks of genetically identical sheep do
not occur in nature. This state of affairs is frankly Byzantine and antithetical to
Congress’s purpose (uniformity and predictability in U.S. patent law) for creating
the Federal Circuit, as well as being contrary to the principles of clarity and the
creation of “bright line rules” that arguably prompted the Supreme Court to begin
its heightened scrutiny of the Court and its opinions (if not philosophy). The
Federal Circuit’s current path is contrary to the idea that patent claims should be
readily understandable to well-intended business people and frank (or in current
parlance, “efficient”) infringers alike and also contrary to the Founders’ attitudes
regarding patenting as a way to encourage disclosure of new inventions for the
public good. Having such a path will give little relief to those who have lost patent
rights under the current regime, but at least it provides a way for inventors to obtain
patent-eligible claims no matter what other branches of government do in
addressing this issue. Innovation, especially in the diagnostic and life sciences arts,
requires no more and is entitled to no less.
F. *Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative Services (February 12, 2019)
and (July 3, 2019) (per curiam, from denial for rehearing en banc)
The Athena case illustrated in the starkest of terms the consequences of the
Supreme Court’s ill-advised Mayo/Alice test for subject matter ineligibility and the
Federal Circuit’s failure to apply the test in a manner that would reign in its
innovation-inhibiting effects.208
The claims at issue were claims 6–9 of U.S. Patent No. 7,267,820,209 which recite:
6. A method for diagnosing neurotransmission or developmental disorders related to
muscle specific tyrosine kinase (MuSK) in a mammal comprising the step of detecting
in a bodily fluid of said mammal autoantibodies to an epitope of muscle specific tyrosine
kinase (MuSK), wherein said method comprises the steps of: a) contacting said bodily
fluid with muscle specific tyrosine kinase (MuSK) or an antigenic determinant thereof;
and b) detecting any antibody-antigen complexes formed between said receptor
tyrosine kinase or an antigenic fragment thereof and antibodies present in said bodily
fluid, wherein the presence of said complexes is indicative of said mammal suffering
from said neurotransmission or developmental disorders, wherein said antibodyantigen complex is detected using an anti-IgG antibody tagged or labeled with a
reporter molecule, whereby the intensity of the signal from the anti-human IgG
antibody is indicative of the relative amount of the anti-MuSK autoantibody in the

208

See generally Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir.
2019), petition for reh’g denied per curiam, 927 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
209

Athena Diagnostics, 915 F.3d at 746; see also U.S. Patent No. 7,267,820 (filed June 15, 2001).
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bodily fluid when compared to a positive and negative control reading.
7. A method according to claim 1, comprising contacting MuSK or an epitope or
antigenic determinant thereof having a suitable label thereon, with said bodily fluid,
immunoprecipitating any antibody/MuSK complex or antibody/MuSK epitope or
antigenic determinant complex from said bodily fluid and monitoring for said label on
any of said antibody/MuSK complex or antibody/MuSK epitope or antigen determinant
complex, wherein the presence of said label is indicative of said mammal is suffering
from said neurotransmission or developmental disorder related to muscle specific
tyrosine kinase (MuSK).
8. A method according to claim 7 wherein said label is a radioactive label.
9. A method according to claim 8 wherein said label is I.210

These claims were invalidated at the District Court on a motion to dismiss under
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6).211 This decision was affirmed by a Federal Circuit panel on
February 19, 2019 in an opinion by Judge Lourie joined by Judge Stoll and over a
vigorous dissent by Judge Newman. As has been the frustrating reality over the
course of several years, the majority rendered its decision as being mandated by the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Mayo and Alice  despite maintaining a philosophical
position that such an application of this jurisprudence was wrong and inhibited
rather than promoted innovation and progress.212
It is unnecessary to belabor these opinions by the panel, because the Federal
Circuit’s salient illustration of the disjointed opinions on its own and the Supreme
Court’s eligibility jurisprudence was put on frank and open display when the court,
per curiam, denied Athena’s petition for rehearing en banc. 213 This opinion was
accompanied by four concurrences and four dissents, representing the thinking of
every member of the court. Comparisons of some of the thinking of the judges
provides insights into how the members of the Court view their role in the judicial
scheme regarding patent law.
Judge Lourie, joined by Judges Reyna and Chen, voiced the view, first
enunciated by Judge Linn in Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc,214 that as an
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U.S. Patent No. 7,267,820 (the italicized portions set forth in claim 6 were derived from claims
1, 2, and 3, from which claim 6 ultimately depended).
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Athena Diagnostics, 915 F.3d at 746–47.
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See id. at 749.
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See Donald Zuhn, Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, LLC (Fed. Cir. 2019),
Patent Docs (July 09, 2019), https://www.patentdocs.org/2019/07/athena-diagnostics-inc-vmayo-collaborative-services-llc-fed-cir-2019.html#comments [https://perma.cc/V3JN-3ZHE].
Kevin E. Noonan, Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2015), Patent Docs (June
22, 2015), https://www.patentdocs.org/2015/06/ariosa-diagnostics-inc-v-sequenom-inc-fed-cir2015.html [https://perma.cc/TWL2-WCT3].

214

306

BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT LAW TOP TEN OF 2019

inferior appellate court, its hands are tied by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,215 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank
Int’l,216and Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.217:
If I could write on a clean slate, I would write as an exception to patent eligibility, as
respects natural laws, only claims directed to the natural law itself, e.g., E=mc2, F=ma,
Boyle’s Law, Maxwell’s Equations, etc. I would not exclude uses or detection of natural
laws. The laws of anticipation, obviousness, indefiniteness, and written description
provide other filters to determine what is patentable . . . . But we do not write here on a
clean slate; we are bound by Supreme Court precedent.218

This view is apparently shared by seven of the Court’s twelve members.
Judge O’Malley enunciated the countervailing view regarding what the Court
should do to change this state of affairs. In her opinion the Court has gone astray
in slavishly and too stringently applying the Supreme Court’s precedent to
unnecessarily restrict the scope of what is eligible (particularly with regard to
diagnostic method claims, including the ones at issue before the Court in Athena):
I agree with all my dissenting colleagues that our precedent applies the Supreme Court’s
holding in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 132 S.Ct.
1289, 182 L.Ed.2d 321 (2012) too broadly. I write separately, however, because I believe
that confusion and disagreements over patent eligibility have been engendered by the
fact that the Supreme Court has ignored Congress’s direction to the courts to apply 35
U.S.C. sections 101, et seq (“Patent Act”) as written. Specifically, the Supreme Court has
instructed federal courts to read into Section 101 an “inventive concept” requirement—
a baffling standard that Congress removed when it amended the Patent Act in 1952. I
encourage Congress to amend the Patent Act once more to clarify that it meant what it
said in 1952.219

It is clear that Congress is the ultimate (or perhaps only) solution. But if Judge
O’Malley identifies the Federal Circuit’s complicity in engendering the current
situation, Judge Newman (joined by Judge Wallach) in dissent enumerated the
Court’s application of Supreme Court precedent to diagnostic method claims, all of
215

Kwame Mensah, Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. (2012), PATENT DOCS
(Mar.
20,
2012),
https://www.patentdocs.org/2012/03/mayo-collaborative-services-vprometheus-laboratories-inc-2012.html [https://perma.cc/22YS-3Q3C].

Kevin E. Noonan, Supreme Court Issues Decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, Patent Docs (June
19, 2014), https://www.patentdocs.org/2014/06/supreme-court-issues-decision-in-alice-corp-vcls-bank.html [https://perma.cc/SS3U-XYJM].
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Donald Zuhn, Supreme Court Issues Decision in AMP v. Myriad, Patent Docs (June 13, 2013),
https://www.patentdocs.org/2013/06/supreme-court-issues-decision-in-amp-v-myriad.html
[https://perma.cc/QU49-GB37].
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Athena, 927 F.3d at 1335 (Lourie, Rena, Chen, JJJ., concurring).
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Id. at 1371 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
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these decisions invalidating the patents at issue:
1. In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litigation, 774 F.3d 755 (Fed.
Cir. 2014). The claimed invention is a method for screening for genes linked to inherited
breast and ovarian cancer, by analyzing for certain mutations in the DNA. The court
held the claims ineligible under section 101 as directed to a law of nature, and also held
that identifying genetic mutations is an ineligible abstract idea.220
2. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The claimed
invention is a method for detecting paternally inherited fetal abnormalities by
analyzing the blood or serum of a pregnant female. The court held the claims ineligible
under section 101, while recognizing that “detecting cffDNA in maternal plasma or
serum that before was discarded as waste material is a positive and valuable
contribution to science.” Id. at 1380.221
3. Genetic Technologies Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The claimed
invention is a method for detecting a coding region of DNA based on its relationship to
non-coding regions, by amplifying genomic DNA with a primer spanning a non-coding
sequence in genetic linkage to an allele to be detected. The court stated that “the patent
claim focuses on a newly discovered fact about human biology.”222
4. Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
The claimed invention is a method for diagnosing risk of cardiovascular disease by
analyzing for the enzyme myeloperoxidase (“MPO”). The court held that even though
prior methods for detecting MPO were inferior, the discovery of how to directly analyze
for MPO, and discovery of the relation to the risk of cardiovascular disease, although
“groundbreaking, ‘even such valuable contributions can fall short of statutory
patentable subject matter.’”223
5. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc. v. CEPHEID, 905 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The claimed
invention is a method for detecting the pathogenic bacterium Mycobacterium tuberculosis
(MTB), based on nucleotide content and a novel method of analysis. The court stated
that the method is new, unobvious, and “both faster and more accurate than the
traditional MTB detection methods,” id. at 1366, but held that the method is ineligible
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Id. at 1367 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also Kevin E. Noonan, In re BRCA1- and BRCA2-based
Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litigation (Fed. Cir. 2014), Patent Docs (Dec. 17, 2014),
https://www.patentdocs.org/2014/12/in-re-brca1-and-brca2-based-hereditary-cancer-testpatent-litigation-fed-cir-2014.html [https://perma.cc/W2L7-UBF3].
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Athena, 927 F.3d at 1367 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Athena, 927 F.3d at 1367 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also Kevin E. Noonan, Genetic Technologies
Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C. (Fed. Cir. 2016), PATENT DOCS (Apr. 10, 2016), https://www.patentdocs.org/
2016/04/genetic-technologies-ltd-v-merial-llc-fed-cir-2016.html
[https://perma.cc/V6A6NMWG].
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Athena, 927 F.3d at 1367 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also Kevin E. Noonan, Cleveland Clinic
Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC (Fed. Cir. 2017), Patent Docs (June 26, 2017),
https://www.patentdocs.org/2017/06/cleveland-clinic-foundation-v-true-health-diagnostics-llcfed-cir-2017.html [https://perma.cc/QTM9-G9A5].
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under section 101.224
6. Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 760 F. App’x 1013 (Fed. Cir.
2019). The claimed invention is the novel immunoassay to detect the correlation
between blood MPO levels and cardiovascular disease. The court held that the claims
are for a law of nature and ineligible under section 101.225

Conversely, as Judge Newman notes in her dissent, the Federal Circuit has
repeatedly affirmed eligibility of “method of treatment” claims, in Rapid Litigation
Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc.; Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward
Pharmaceuticals International Ltd.; Natural Alternatives Int’l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds,
LLC; and Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.226
Both Judge Moore (writing in dissent) and Judge Chen (concurring) also
recognize the problematic nature of the Court’s jurisprudence on patent eligibility.
And each agree with Judge O’Malley that Congress alone can address the issue,
Judge Moore stating that:
In the wake of Mayo, we have painted with a broad brush, suggesting that improved
diagnostic techniques are not patent eligible. Mayo did not go so far, and given the
import of diagnostic techniques, we should reconsider this case and clarify our
precedent. Because my colleagues have declined to do so, there are no more options at
this court for diagnostic patents. My colleagues’ refusal deflates the Amici’s hopeful
suggestion that our precedent leaves the eligibility of a diagnostic claim in front of the
Federal Circuit “uncertain.” It is no longer uncertain. Since Mayo, every diagnostic
claim to come before this court has been held ineligible. While we believe that such
claims should be eligible for patent protection, the majority of this court has definitively
concluded that the Supreme Court prevents us from so holding. No need to waste
resources with additional en banc requests.227

Judge Hughes, joined by Chief Judge Prost and Judge Taranto concurred with
the per curiam denial of en banc review, albeit not without some reservations:
I, for one, would welcome further explication of eligibility standards in the area of
diagnostics patents. Such standards could permit patenting of essential lifesaving
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Athena, 927 F.3d at 1367–68 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also Kevin E. Noonan, Roche Molecular
Systems, Inc. v. Cepheid (Fed. Cir. 2018), Patent Docs (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.patentdocs.org/
2018/10/roche-molecular-systems-inc-v-cepheid-fed-cir-2018.html
[https://perma.cc/7H2CD2H9].
225

Athena, 927 F.3d at 1368 (Newman, J., dissenting) (including Athena there are seven such
cases); see also Donald Zuhn, Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC (Fed. Cir.
2019), Patent Docs (Apr. 07, 2019), https://www.patentdocs.org/2019/04/cleveland-clinicfoundation-v-true-health-diagnostics-llc-fed-cir-2019.html [https://perma.cc/3MML-W2VL].
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Athena, 927 F.3d at 1368 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 887 F.3d
1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018); 918 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019); 919 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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inventions based on natural laws while providing a reasonable and measured way to
differentiate between overly broad patents claiming natural laws and truly worthy
specific applications. Such an explication might come from the Supreme Court. Or it
might come from Congress, with its distinctive role in making the factual and policy
determinations relevant to setting the proper balance of innovation incentives under
patent law.228
Judge Chen also concurred:
When it comes to applying the judicial exceptions, it bears noting that the Mayo
analytical approach is considerably harder to apply consistently than the Diehr
framework, and more aggressive in its reach. Consider the claim in Mayo. If that claim
had recited just the single step of administering a synthetic drug to a patient, that
single-step claim would be patent-eligible, but lack novelty under § 102. And if that
claim added a second step for determining the subsequent level of a non-naturally
occurring metabolite in a patient, that claim also would pass muster under § 101, but
lack novelty. But when the claim further recites a relationship between a metabolite
level and its efficacy in a patient, that claim suddenly would be invalid under § 101 for
violating the law of nature exception. In other words, steps 1 and 2 now get pushed aside
and declared insignificant, and the last step is designated as the “focus” of the claim, i.e.,
the heart of the invention. The notion that adding claim language can convert an
otherwise patent-eligible claim into a patent-ineligible claim is counterintuitive and a
very difficult thing to explain to 8,000 patent examiners. Moreover, the process of
determining what the claim is “really about” when the claim is viewed in pieces, rather
than as a whole, can be highly subjective and impressionistic.229

Judge Dyk wrote most extensively, joined by Judge Hughes and in part by Judge
Chen. Informative nuggets of this opinion include:
[T]here is tension between Mayo and the Supreme Court’s later decision in Association
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 133 S.Ct. 2107, 186 L.Ed.2d 124
(2013), and that the holding of Mayo may be overbroad. The language of § 101 does cover
“discover[ies],” 35 U.S.C. § 101, and there is no doubt that determining the relationship
between specific genetic abnormalities and specific diseases constitutes an important
discovery with proven utility. There is much to be said for the patentability of claims to
such discoveries, if not drafted overbroadly.230

But he also sees some benefits in the Court’s approach to subject matter eligibility:
In the realm of abstract ideas, the Mayo/Alice framework has successfully screened out
claims that few would contend should be patent eligible, for example, those that merely
apply well-known business methods and other processes using computers or the
Internet. The Mayo/Alice framework has thus proven to be both valuable and effective
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Id. at 1337 (Hughes, J., concurring).
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Id. at 1348–49 (Chen, J., concurring).
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Id. at 1340 (Dyk, J., concurring).
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at invalidating overly broad, non-inventive claims that would effectively “grant a
monopoly over an abstract idea.”231

Judge O’Malley provided an additional avenue for Congressional intervention
The Judge notes the Supreme Court’s resurrection of the “inventive concept” trope
which many believed was relegated to the dustbin of history by Section 103 in Giles
Sutherland Rich’s revision resulting in the 1952 Patent Act. 232 She provides an
alternative to Senator Tillis’ and Coons’ proposed statutory abrogation of the
judicial exceptions (which raises its own issues on Congressional authority and the
Supreme Court’s oversight on ultra vires legislative actions). Judge O’Malley’s
suggestion is direct:
Had the Supreme Court not disregarded Congress’s wishes for a second time [by
introducing “inventive concept” into its Section 101 calculus], perhaps the outcome in
this case would be different. . . . Indeed, claims directed to uses of natural laws rather
than the natural laws themselves would be eligible under § 101 as written. Because the
Supreme Court judicially revived the invention requirement and continues to apply it
despite express abrogation, I dissent to encourage Congress to clarify that there should
be no such requirement read into § 101; to clarify that concepts of novelty and
“invention” are to be assessed via application of other provisions of the Patent Act
Congress designed for that purpose.233

And Judge Moore is characteristically direct in setting forth the consequences
of the Federal Circuit’s refusal to consider the eligibility of Athena’s claims en banc:
Since Mayo, every diagnostic claim to come before this court has been held ineligible.
While we believe that such claims should be eligible for patent protection, the majority
of this court has definitively concluded that the Supreme Court prevents us from so
holding. No need to waste resources with additional en banc requests. Your only hope
lies with the Supreme Court or Congress. I hope that they recognize the importance of
these technologies, the benefits to society, and the market incentives for American
business. And, oh yes, that the statute clearly permits the eligibility of such inventions
and that no judicially-created exception should have such a vast embrace. It is neither a
good idea, nor warranted by the statute.234

For those keeping score, it appears that all (or almost all) of the members of the
Court believe that their patent eligibility cases have been wrongly decided. Chief
Judge Prost, joined by Judges Lourie, Dyk, Reyna, Hughes, Taranto, and Chen
believe the Court’s hands are tied by Supreme Court precedent, while Judges
Newman, Moore, O’Malley, Wallach, and Stoll believe the Federal Circuit has the
basis to distinguish Supreme Court precedent and hold these claims (or at least
231

Id. at 1337.

232

See Athena, 927 F.3d at 1371 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
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claims 79 of Athena’s claims at issue) are patent eligible.
The issue for the Federal Circuit is not just that their views are so fractured, but
that the dissension between the Judges has precluded the benefits envisioned when
the Federal Circuit was created. The Judges apparently cannot decide whether they
should simply apply Supreme Court precedent (even incorrectly) until such time as
the Supreme Court deigns to address the issue, or whether their "special expertise"
and Congressional mandate creates a responsibility to distinguish the Supreme
Court's precedent when it does not properly apply. And the dissension prevents the
Court from at least providing incentive to the Supreme Court to provide (in its view)
the correct interpretation of what is and what is not patent eligible. In at least the
view of five of the judges (and many in the patent bar) the Federal Circuit has failed
in exercising its responsibility, to the extent that many openly speculate whether
U.S. patent law needs the Federal Circuit at all.
G. Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals Int’l. Ltd.
(Fed Cir. 2018)
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward
Pharmaceuticals Int’l. Ltd. hat the method of treatment claims were likely to be patent
eligible provided a ray of hope with regard to the fraught nature of subject-matter
eligibility in life sciences patenting.235
The case arose in ANDA litigation over Vanda’s methods for treating
schizophrenia with Fanapt® (iloperidone), particularly directed to adjusting
(reducing) dosages in patients expressing a variant of a cytochrome P450 2D6 gene
(CYP2D6) that metabolizes this and other drugs more poorly than other alleles of
the gene. 236 This genotype is significant because it is associated with a
predisposition to cause QTc prelongation, a condition that can result in serious
heart problems.237 On inspection the parallels with the facts in Mayo Collaborative
Services v Prometheus Labs are evident.
Vanda asserted two patents, Reissue Patent RE 39,198 and U.S. Patent No.
8,586,610, The ‘610 Patent issued after ANDA litigation had been initiated over the
‘198 Patent and expires significantly later. This procedural posture raised a
jurisdictional issue over whether the District Court could include this patent in the
ANDA litigation (the Federal Circuit ruled that it could).238
235

See generally Athena, 927 F.3d 1333; see generally 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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Id. at 1122.
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Id. at 1121.
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Vanda, 887 F.3d 1120–22; see also U.S. Patent No. 8,586,610 (filed Sep. 30, 2005); U.S. Patent No.
RE 39,198 (filed Nov. 15, 2000).
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Claim 1 of the ‘610 Patent was considered representative by the Court:
A method for treating a patient with iloperidone, wherein the patient is suffering from
schizophrenia, the method comprising the steps of:
determining whether the patient is a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer by:
obtaining or having obtained a biological sample from the patient;
and
performing or having performed a genotyping assay on the biological sample to
determine if the patient has a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer genotype; and
if the patient has a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer genotype, then internally administering
iloperidone to the patient in an amount of 12 mg/day or less, and
if the patient does not have a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer genotype, then internally
administering iloperidone to the patient in an amount that is greater than 12 mg/day,
up to 24 mg/day,
wherein a risk of QTc prolongation for a patient having a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer
genotype is lower following the internal administration of 12 mg/day or less than it
would be if the iloperidone were administered in an amount of greater than 12 mg/day,
up to 24 mg/day.239

The District Court found the ‘198 and ‘610 atents not invalid and the ‘198 Patent
infringed by West-Ward’s ANDA filing under 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(2. West-Ward also
was liable of inducing infringement under 35 U.S.C. §271(b). Infringement was
dependent on West-Ward’s proposed label, which was substantially identical to
Vanda’s Fanapt® label and recited a “recommendation” that (1) “practitioners use
iloperidone to treat patients suffering from schizophrenia”; (2) “oral administration
of iloperidone tablets at 12 to 24 mg/day to nongenotypic CYP2D6 poor metabolizers
and 12 mg/day or less to genotypic CYP2D6 poor metabolizers”; and (3)
“practitioners perform or have performed a genotyping assay to determine whether
patients are CYP2D6 poor metabolizers.” 240
Regarding West-Ward’s invalidity contentions, the District Court rejected
challenges based on §§101, 103, and 112(awritten description). Specifically with
regard to subject-matter eligibility, the District Court held that while the asserted
claims depended upon laws of nature they were not directed to those laws. They
thus satisfied the subject matter eligibility requirements under the Supreme Court’s
Mayo/Alice test:
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patentineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?” To
answer that question, we consider the elements of each claim both individually and “as
an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional elements “transform the
239

Vanda, 887 F.3d at 1121.

240

Id. at 1122–23.
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nature of the claim”into a patent-eligible application. We have described step two of
this analysis as a search for an “inventive concept”— i.e., an element or combination of
elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly
more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”241

Finally, the District Court held that the provisions for delaying FDA approval
until after expiration of patents asserted in ANDA litigation under 35 U.S.C.
§271(e)(4)(A) were not available remedies for infringement of the ‘610 Patent under
35 U.S.C. §271(b). Therefore, the court was able to exercise its “general equitable
power” to impose an equivalent injunction.242
The Federal Circuit affirmed, in an opinion by Judge Lourie joined by Judge
Hughes, with Chief Judge Prost dissenting on the subject-matter eligibility
question. The opinion affirmed the resolution of the procedural issues that had
arisen in the ANDA litigation context and the District Court’s determination that
the asserted claims were not invalid under §§103 and 112(a). 243 But it is the
majority’s opinion on the §101 question that is of particular interest here.
Judge Lourie refuted West-Ward’s analogy of these claims to the claims in Mayo
(“This case, however, is not Mayo”). First, in his view the Mayo claims “were not
directed to a novel method of treating a disease,”but rather they “were directed to a
diagnostic method based on the ‘relationships between concentrations of certain
metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will
prove ineffective or cause harm.’” 244 The Supreme Court interpreted the Mayo
claims to merely recite a relationship that is “a consequence of the ways in which
thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body—entirely natural processes.
And so a patent that simply describes that relation sets forth a natural law.” 245
Importantly, the opinion notes the distinction that the Mayo claims “w[ere] not
directed to the application of a drug to a particular disease” (again, the
administering step being well-known in the art).246 And even the Supreme Court in
its Mayo decision recognized the distinction between the Mayo claims and “method
of [medical] treatment” claims here, wherein the Supreme Court stated “[u]nlike,
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Id. at 1133–34 (citing Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (citations
omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73, 75-79))).
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say, a typical patent on a new drug or a new way of using an existing drug, the patent
claims do not confine their reach to particular applications of those laws.”247
Here, the majority notes, while the inventors recognized the relationships
between “iloperidone, CYP2D6 metabolism, and QTc prolongation,” that is not what
they claimed; “[t]hey claimed an application of that relationship.”248 The majority
recognizes this to be an example of “a new way of using an existing drug” that had
received, albeit in dicta, the Supreme Court’s imprimatur of eligibility in Mayo.249
The opinion also notes that the claims at issue here do not implicate undue
preemption that was a concern (perhaps the concern) in Mayo, because the Mayo
claim was not a treatment claim and could (at least in theory) be infringed even if a
doctor did not change treatment decisions as a consequence of practicing the
claimed method.250 This distinction was significant for the court because it “did not
involve doctors using the natural relationship between the metabolite level and
lessening ‘the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or
cause harm.’”251
The majority found support for these distinctions in the court’s Rapid Litigation
Management v. Cellzdirect opinion. 252 There, “a method of producing a desired
preparation of multi-cryopreserved hepatocytes cells” was determined to be patent
eligible because it employed “the natural ability of the subject matter to undergo the
process,” which did not make those claim “directed to” the natural phenomenon
under the Mayo/Alice principles.253
The crux (and perhaps the genius) of Judge Lourie’s distinctions between the
invention claimed by Vanda and the patent-ineligible claims in Mayo is best
identified by a litany of specificities. Namely, “the claims here are directed to a
specific method of treatment for specific patients using a specific compound at specific
doses to achieve a specific outcome (emphases added).”254
The panel majority held that these claims recited more than the natural
relationship, in distinction with Mayo, but rather a method of using these
relationships to treat patients, beneficially reducing the risk of developing
247

Id. at 1134–35.
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Vanda Pharm., 887 F.3d at 1135 (reviewing U.S. Patent No. 8,586,610 (filed Sep. 30, 2005)).
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Vanda Pharm., 887 F.3d at 1142 (citing Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d
1042, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
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treatment complications.255
Chief Judge Prost did not see these distinctions and believed that these claims
were indistinguishable from the claims in Mayo and hence should be patentineligible.256
The Supreme Court denied certiorari thus, for now, method of medical
treatment  fall outside the proscription on life sciences patenting as applied,
for example, to diagnostic method claims (see, Athena Diagnostics).257
H. *Idenix Pharma v. Gilead Sciences
Section 112 of the Patent Act as codified, entitled “Specification” in the statute,
specifies the amount of disclosure required to support a patent claim, among other
requirements.258 Section 112(a) contains three requirements: written description,
enablement, and best mode.259 In Idenix Pharmaceuticals LLC v. Gilead Sciences Inc.,
the Federal Circuit held that Idenix’s patent was invalid on two grounds, affirming
the District Court’s overturning of a jury verdict on enablement and the District
Court’s post-trial denial of judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) regarding
satisfaction of the written description requirement. 260 In doing so, the Court
illustrated ways in which it has been able to impose its views on both aspects of
Section 112 requirements despite its reliance on fact finding by the jury or district
court below (with Judge Newman characteristically dissenting from what she
viewed as appellate court overreach by her brethren).261
The case arose in litigation over Idenix’s U.S. Patent No. 7,608,597 that was
directed to drugs for treating hepatitis C virus (HCV), which Idenix alleged Gilead
would infringe by launch of its sofobuvir (Solvadi®) HCV treatment. 262
Independent claim 1 of the ‘597 Patent is representative of Idenix’s invention: “1. A
method for the treatment of a hepatitis C virus infection, comprising administering
an effective amount of a purine or pyrimidine -D-2’-methyl-ribofuranosyl
nucleoside or a phosphate thereof, or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt or ester

255

Id. (reviewing ‘610 Patent).

256

Id. at 1143 (Prost, J., dissenting) (reviewing ‘610 Patent).
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Athena, 915 F.3d at 750.
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35 U.S.C. §112 (2012).
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Id. §112(a) (although the latter has been in something of a state of limbo since the LeahySmith America Invents Act (AIA) disabled it as a defense).
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See generally Idenix Pharm. 941 F.3d 1149.
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Id. at 1154, 1163, 1166 (Newman, J., dissenting).

262

Id. at 1153 (reviewing U.S. Patent No. 7,608,597 (filed June 20, 2003)).
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thereof.”263 The opinion illustrates the structure of the purine or pyrimidine -D-2’methyl-ribofuranosyl nucleoside as disclosed in the ‘597 Patent:

which differs from naturally occurring embodiments by the substitution of a methyl
group at the 2’ position on the ribofuranosyl sugar, cis to the nitrogenous base (or in
the “up” position as understood by the Federal Circuit).264 Gilead argued (and the
District Court and Federal Circuit agreed) that the ‘597 Patent specification did not
provide guidance regarding the “billions” of possible molecules falling within the
scope of the claims.265 This argument was based on the acknowledged difference
between the compounds exemplified in the ‘597 Patent (having a hydroxyl, -OH,
group at the 2’ “down” position), while Gilead’s accused infringing compound had a
fluorine atom at that position. 266 After protracted (“years,” according to the
opinion) litigation, the District Court conducted a jury trial in which Gilead
conceded infringement but challenged the ‘597 Patent claims as failing to satisfy the
Section 112(a) enablement requirement.267 This trial resulted in a jury verdict that
Idenix’s ‘597 Patent claims were not invalid for lack of enablement under Section
112(a).268 The Court granted Gilead’s JMOL motion overturning the jury’s verdict
but denied Gilead’s JMOL motion that the claims were invalid for failing to satisfy
the written description requirement.269 This appeal followed.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court’s JMOL decision on enablement
and reversed the District Court’s denial of JMOL on written description, in an
opinion by Chief Judge Prost joined by Judge Wallach; Judge Newman dissented.270
The majority rendered its decision under the de novo review standard applied to
JMOL motions, which permitted the appellate panel to more easily dismiss the jury’s
263

U.S. Patent No. 7,608,597 (filed June 20, 2003).
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factual determinations.271 The majority opinion characterized the issue before the
Court as “whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would know, without undue
experimentation, which 2’-methyl-up nucleosides would be effective for treating
HCV.” 272 The majority held that the answer to this question is no, because “a
reasonable jury would not have had a legally sufficient basis to find otherwise.”273
The opinion rendered its decision by applying the factors delineated in In re Wands,
858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988): (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary; (2)
how routine any necessary experimentation is in the relevant field; (3) whether the
patent discloses specific working examples of the claimed invention; (4) the amount
of guidance presented in the patent; (5) the nature and predictability of the field; (6)
the level of ordinary skill; and (7) the scope of the claimed invention.274
For context in appreciating how the majority applied the Wands factors, it is
relevant to consider that the chemical arts have traditionally been considered
unpredictable as compared with, for example, mechanical inventions. A
mechanical device comprising a fastener, for example, could have as embodiments
a handful of alternatives (e.g., a screw, a nail, a rivet, a bolt, glue, VelcroChemical
compounds, in contrast, can have a multiplicity of substituents at a multiplicity of
positions in a molecule, wherein the permutations can quickly exceed hundreds of
thousands to millions, while but a few hundred exemplary compounds are disclosed
in the specification.275 The biotechnological arts are even more complex, for at least
two reasons. First, the molecules are even larger and have the capacity for
additional substitutions, and the effects of those substitutions on function of
biological molecules are themselves unpredictable. 276 These scientific facts
engendered the Federal Circuit’s explication of the application of the written
description requirement of Section 112 that culminated in the Court’s en banc Ariad
v. Eli Lilly decision (as well as earlier promulgation of Guidance from the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office in 2001). 277 Paradoxically, biotechnology patents (unlike
chemical patents) do not disclose hundreds of exemplars (and frequently only one
271
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or a few), which has led to the scope of biotechnology claims to be relatively
narrow.278
These considerations provide an opportunity for the Federal Circuit to apply the
factors set out in Wands stringently to find failure to satisfy the enablement
requirement of Section 112(a), as the Court did here. Going in order, the majority
agreed with the District Court that the amount of experimentation required to
support the “billions and billions” of putative species was high, supported by
Gilead’s expert testimony. 279 The District Court and the majority held that
experimentation was too high even if mitigating circumstances would have
presented a much smaller number of species (thousands) to the person of ordinary
skill in the art.280 This aspect of Idenix’s argument was contradicted by its own
evidence that “the field of modifying nucleosides for anti-HCV activity was ‘in its
infancy’ and ‘unpredictable.’” 281 This conclusion was also supported by evidence
that “many” of the candidate nucleosides would need to be synthesized because they
were not commercially available, although the majority acknowledges that such
synthesis was routine.282
The majority then turned to the “working examples” and “amount of guidance”
factors, which the opinion not surprisingly held supported non-enablement.283 The
opinion asserts in support of this conclusion that “Claim 1 requires more than just
an identification of 2’-methyl-up: it requires identification of which 2’-methyl-up
nucleosides will effectively treat HCV” and that “[w]ithout specific guidance on that
point, the specification provides ‘only a starting point, a direction for further
research.’” 284 The (un)predictability prong of the factors was supported by trial
testimony from both parties’ experts, and the claim scope prong (essentially
overbreadth) followed from the majority’s conclusions regarding the rest of the
factors.285 The opinion’s discussion characterized the situation as the person of skill
in the art “the ‘large number’ of 2’-methyl-up nucleosides falls into the ‘small’ group
of candidates that effectively treats HCV.”286
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As a consequence of these analyses, the majority readily concluded that the
District Court correctly granted JMOL because no reasonable jury could conclude
anything other than that Idenix did not satisfy the written description
requirement.287 The opinion notes that their decision has “striking similarities” to
Wyeth and Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories based on the “millions of compounds
made by varying the substituent groups” in that case wherein “only a ‘significantly
smaller’ subset of those compounds would have the claimed ‘functional effects.’”288
The opinion says that the decision here, as in Wyeth, “rests on the ‘limits on
permissible experimentation,’” and states the somewhat new principle that
“[w]here, as here, ‘practicing the full scope of the claims would have required
excessive experimentation, even if routine,’ the patent is invalid for lack of
enablement.”289
Turning to the written description issue, the majority readily pivoted from its
enablement decision to hold that the ‘597 Patent specification fails to provide an
adequate written description because there was insufficient evidence that the
Idenix inventors possessed the invention throughout its full scope.290 In particular,
the majority held that there was no evidence that the ‘597 Patent inventors were in
possession of Gilead’s product.291 As has been the case since the Federal Circuit’s
seminal decision in Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly, the absence of
explicit disclosure of this species, in the further absence of a sufficient number of
species to define a genus comprising Gilead’s species, or structure/function
relationships that would ensnare this species within the scope of the species
expressly disclosed, was enough for the majority to conclude that the specification
failed to satisfy the written description requirement.292
The majority rejected Idenix’s argument that the specification provided
“abundant traditional blazemarks for the claims—working examples, formulas,
data, synthesis routes, and the target,” stating that the flaw in this analysis was that
Idenix provided “lists or examples of supposedly effective nucleosides, but do not
explain what makes them effective, or why.” 293 In almost the reverse of the
287
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majority’s reasoning regarding enablement, the opinion states that “the
specification lists tens or hundreds of thousands of possible nucleosides,
substituent-by-substituent, with dozens of distinct stereochemical structures, and
yet the compound in question is conspicuously absent.”294
Judge Newman dissented; the tone of the dissent, and that of a footnote in the
majority opinion regarding the dissent, denotes a certain impatience on the part of
both authors with the opinions of the other. Judge Newman contends that “[t]he
large number of unclaimed chemical variants in the specification are not described,
not synthesized, and not tested for antiviral activity”, and thus “[i]t is incorrect to
include these variants in the claims and then to invalidate the claims because these
variants are not described and not enabled.”295 The Judge believes that a reasonable
jury could have considered the claims as being limited to the much smaller number
of species exemplified in the specification and thus both enabled and adequately
described. 296 She characterizes the majority’s enablement theory as flawed for
requiring description of “unclaimed and unsupported subject matter,” and states
that “a reasonable jury could have understood that subject matter that is unclaimed
is irrelevant to validity under Section 112.”297
In Judge Newman’s view, the claims are limited by what is exemplified in the
specification; interpreting claim scope necessarily restricts the scope to that
disclosure. 298 This is certainly a more parsimonious interpretation than the
majority’s and has the advantage that it would guard against a patentee expanding
the scope of a claim to encompass species that a conscientious competitor pursues
in an effort to avoid the claim. The dissent recites copiously (eighteen separate
citations, with the opinion stating there are “much more” ) from the expert
testimony in this regard.299 Judge Newman asserts that:
It was undisputed that the ‘597 Patent specification did not describe and enable
products other than those whose synthesis and antiviral properties were shown in the
specification, all of which had the narrow formula of three OH groups and a CH3 group
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as pictured. A reasonable jury could have so viewed the claims.300

She further states the jurisprudential principle that “[c]ourts are not free to
reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could
have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other
results are more reasonable.”301 Judge Newman concludes her dissent by stating
that, despite Gilead’s stipulation of infringement, the proper outcome of this case
would be that the ‘597 Patent claims were not invalid (when properly cabined to the
scope supported by the specification) and not infringed by Gilead’s fluorinated
product (based on testimony as well as the absence of this species in the ‘597 Patent
disclosure).302
In her own way, Judge Newman is putting her appellate thumb as heavily on the
scale as did the majority. In contrast, her jurisprudence would preserve the patent
within the scope of the disclosure while absolving Gilead of infringement, while the
majority’s approach seems to be to interpret the claims broadly to reach the
conclusion that they are invalid. This decision continues the appearance, illustrated
most starkly in the court’s decision denying rehearing en banc in Athena Diagnostics
v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 303 that the court is seriously fractured in how it
approaches its role as principal arbiter of U.S. patent law.
I. Nalpropion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Actavis Laboratories FL, Inc. (Fed.
Cir. 2019)
In Nalpropion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Actavis Laboratories FL, Inc., the Federal
Circuit reversed findings of non-obviousness and affirmed (over Chief Judge Prost’s
dissent) a finding that claims asserted in ANDA litigation were not invalid for
failure to satisfy the written description requirement. 304
ANDA litigation arose over Nalpropion Pharma’s Contrave® extended-release
tablets of the combination of naltrexone hydrochloride and buproprion
hydrochloride, for treatment of obesity, and Orange Book-listed U.S. Patent Nos.
7,375,111; 7,462,626; and 8,916,195. 305 The following claims were at issue in this
300
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litigation:
Claim 11 of the ‘195 Patent:
A method of treating overweight or obesity having reduced adverse effects
comprising orally administering daily about 32 mg of naltrexone and about 360 mg
of bupropion, or pharmaceutically acceptable salts thereof, to a person in need
thereof, wherein the bupropion or pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof is
administered as a sustained release formulation, wherein the naltrexone or
pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof is ad- ministered as a sustained release
formulation, and wherein said sustained release formulation of naltrexone has an
in vitro naltrexone dissolution pro- file in a dissolution test of USP Apparatus 2
Paddle Method at 100 rpm in a dissolution medium of water at 37° C. of:
a) between 39% and 70% of naltrexone re- leased in one hour;
b) between 62% and 90% of naltrexone re- leased in two hours; and
c) at least 99% in 8 hours;
wherein about 16 mg of said sustained re- lease formulation of naltrexone or
a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof is administered twice daily, and
about 180 mg of said sustained release formulation of bupropion or a
pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof is administered twice daily.306

Claim 1 of the ‘111 Patent:
A composition for affecting weight loss comprising:
(a) a sustained release formulation of bupropion or a pharmaceutically
acceptable salt thereof in an amount effective to in- duce weight loss in an
individual; and
(b) a sustained release formulation of naltrexone or a pharmaceutically
acceptable salt thereof in an amount effective to enhance the weight loss
effect of the bupropion or salt thereof;
wherein said composition is in a single oral dosage form fixed combination.307

And claims 26 and 31 of the ‘626 Patent:
A method of treating overweight or obesity, comprising administering a weight loss effective
amount of a first and second compound to an individual who has been diagnosed as suffering
from overweight or obesity in order to treat said overweight or obesity, wherein said first
compound is bupropion, or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, and said second
compound is naltrexone, or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, and wherein the
weight loss activity of said first and second compounds is enhanced compared to the
administration of the same amount of either compound alone, wherein said naltrexone,
or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, and said bupropion, or a
pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, are administered together.
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A method of treating overweight or obesity, comprising administering a weight loss effective
amount of a first and second compound to an individual who has been diagnosed as suffering
from overweight or obesity in order to treat said overweight or obesity, wherein said first
compound is bupropion, or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, and said second
compound is naltrexone, or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, and wherein the
weight loss activity of said first and second compounds is enhanced compared to the
administration of the same amount of either compound alone, wherein at least one of said
maltrexone, or parmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, and said bupropion, or
pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof are in a sustained-release formulation, wherein
said bupropion, or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, and said naltrexone,
or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, are administered in a single oral
dosage form.308

The District Court found that defendant Actavis had not established that claim
11 of the ‘195 Patent was invalid for failure to satisfy the written description
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) with regard to the claim limitation reciting USP
dissolution methods (“USP1” versus “USP2”). 309 The claims expressly recited the
USP 2 Paddle Method, but Actavis argued that the specification disclosed only the
UPS 1 Basket Method.310 The District Court based its decision on the fact that a
skilled worker would have no doubt that the inventors had possession of the
invention based on the nature of the dissolution method disclosed in the
specification. 311 The Court held that disclosure of a “substantially equivalent
method” was sufficient to satisfy the requirement.312
The District Court also rejected Actavis’ arguments that claims 26 and 31 of the
‘626 Patent and claim 1 of the ‘195 Patent were obvious, on the grounds that Actavis’
argument that “it would have been obvious for a person of skill to combine
bupropion and naltrexone for treating overweight and obesity because both drugs
were known to cause weight loss,” amounted to “a classic case of hindsight bias.”313
The Federal Circuit reversed the District Court regarding its obviousness
decision in an opinion by Judge Lourie, joined by Chief Judge Prost and Judge
Wallach, and affirmed the District Court on its written description determination
over Chief Judge Prost’s dissent. The majority’s written description decision was
based in part on the “peculiarity” of the structure of claim 11. This claim is directed
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to a method for treating obesity using specific amounts of the two drugs and
reciting the method for determining the dissolution profile of what the majority
termed “resultant in vitro parameters,” which were not the “operative steps to treat
overweight or obesity.”314 The majority found no clear error in the District Court’s
holding that “irrespective of the method of measurement used, the specification
shows that the inventors possessed the invention of treating overweight or obesity
with naltrexone and bupropion in particular amounts and adequately described
it.” 315 The majority noted that this determination by the District Court was
supported by more credible testimony from Nalpropion Pharma’s expert and
“untrustworthy, self-serving statements by Actavis’s expert.”316 The majority stated
that it refused to disturb the District Court’s weighing of witness credibility in the
performance of its “fact-finding function.”317 The majority further recognized (in
the face of the Chief Judge’s dissent) that “[w]hile as a general matter written
description may not be satisfied by so-called equivalent disclosure,” under these
facts the District Court had not clearly erred.318
Turning to the District Court’s non-obvious determination for claims 26 and 31
of the ‘626 Patent and claim 11 of the ‘111 Patent, the panel unanimously held these
determinations to be error as a matter of law.319 The opinion sets forth the teachings
of the asserted references, characterizing them as disclosing the use of an opioid
antagonist like naltrexone and “withdrawal attenuating agents,” including
buproprion for minimizing weight gain, inter alia, during smoking cessation, and
bupropion or naltrexone alone in weight loss regimes. 320 The Federal Circuit
disagreed with the District Court’s conclusion of non-obviousness, stating that:
The prior art here discloses the claimed components of the composition claims and the
steps of the method claims including the use claimed by the method . . . . The references
teach that bupropion causes weight loss . . . . Likewise, the record indicates that
naltrexone can cause weight loss . . . . Given that both drugs had shown weight loss
effects, we conclude that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to
combine them. In fact, such persons did so.321
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would not and had not approved buproprion for weight loss. The panel found that
this was not dispositive to the question of whether the skilled worker would have
had a motivation to combine the asserted references.322 Further, the opinion states:
The inescapable, real-world fact here is that people of skill in the art did combine
bupropion and naltrexone for reductions in weight gain and reduced cravings—goals
closely relevant to weight loss. Contrary to Nalpropion Pharma’s view, persons of skill
did combine the two drugs even without understanding bupropion’s mechanism of
action but with an understanding that bupropion was well-tolerated and safe as an
antidepressant. . . . (“The precise mechanism for bupropion SR that is responsible for
effects on weight loss is unknown.”) . . . Thus, we conclude that skilled artisans would
have been motivated to combine the two drugs for weight loss with a reasonable
expectation of success [citations to the record omitted].323

The Court found “every limitation of the claims at issue” was found in the asserted
art. The panel also rejected Nalpropion Pharma’s purported evidence for secondary
considerations (failure of others, unexpected results) to rebut their finding that
these claims were obvious.324 According to the Court, “the inventors only combined
two drugs known to affect weight loss. Both drugs were known to affect weight loss,
and combining them for this known purpose as claimed in the patents yields no
unpredictable result.”325 The Federal Circuit thus found claim 11 of the ‘195 Patent
and claims 26 and 31 of the ‘626 Patent to be invalid for obviousness.
The Chief Judge’s dissent on the written description question was based on the
majority’s reliance on “substantially equivalent disclosure” to support claim
language not having clear and explicit support in the specification. 326 The Chief
Judge characterizes the majority’s decision as “add[ing] what appears to me to be a
new rule to this court’s long-standing written description jurisprudence.”327 She
sets forth three reasons for her disagreement with the majority: “[f]irst, the USP 2
clause is limiting. Second, the majority’s ‘substantially equivalent’ rule is
inconsistent with this court’s precedent. Third, the district court clearly erred in
finding that the ‘195 Patent’s written description includes a disclosure ‘substantially
equivalent’ to USP 2.”328
Important to the Chief Judge’s’ reasoning, inter alia, were arguments from the
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prosecution history where the patentee appeared to rely on the dissolution profile
(and the manner of determining it) to distinguish the claims from the prior art.329
The Chief also disagreed with the District Court’s’ (and the majority’s) disregard for
defendant’s expert testimony. The Chief asserted that that the USP1 and USP2
methods would not have produced the same dissolution profile results to have been
relevant to the written description issue before each court.330
J. Nuvo Pharmaceuticals (Ireland) Designated Activity Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s
Laboratories Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2019)
There are provisions and interpretations of U.S. patent law that can be in
tension depending on the circumstances under which they are argued, whether
before an Examiner or during litigation. One of these is the dichotomy between
arguing that the prior art would provide insufficient expectation of success to
render an invention obvious, while at the same time relying on what was known by
a person of skill in the art to minimize the extent of the written description provided
in a specification that satisfies the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(a). This tension proved fatal to the claims at issue in Nuvo Pharmaceuticals v.
Dr. Reddy’s’ Laboratories, decided by the Federal Circuit.331
The case arose as ANDA litigation against Dr. Reddy’s’ Labs (and Mylan and
Lupin entities) over non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) formulated to
diminish recognized gastrointestinal irritation side effects these drugs can cause;
the formulations being claimed in Orange Book-listed U.S. Patent Nos. 6,926,907
and 8,557,285 and sold by Nuvo as Vimovo®. 332 The prior art disclosed efforts to
avoid these side effects by co-administration of NSAIDs with proton pump
inhibitors (PPIs), because stomach acid was believed to contribute to them.333 These
efforts were disadvantageous, inter alia, because stomach acid degraded the PPIs
before they could be absorbed in the small intestine and have their acid-diminishing
effect in the stomach.334 The art showed attempts to remedy these shortcomings by
enterically coating PPIs to resist stomach acid. These efforts did not entirely solve
the problem because the NSAID was degraded if released into the stomach before
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the PPI could reduce stomach acid (e.g., raising the pH by inhibiting the proton
pump responsible for producing the acidic environment therein).335
The inventor of the ‘907 Patent invented a new formulation “that coordinated
the release of an acid inhibitor and an NSAID in a single tablet,” the formulation
comprising a core of an NSAID, enterically coated so that the coating dissolves only
at an elevated pH, and then providing an amount of a PPI sufficient to provide pH
elevated to the enteric cost dissolving level.336
Claim 1 of the ‘907 Patent and claim 1 of the ‘285 Patent are each set forth as
representative in the Federal Circuit’s opinion, respectively:
1. A pharmaceutical composition in unit dosage form suitable for oral administration
to a patient, comprising:
(a) an acid inhibitor present in an amount effective to raise the gastric pH of said
patient to at least 3.5 upon the administration of one or more of said unit dosage
forms;
(b) a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID) in an amount effective to
reduce or eliminate pain or inflammation in said patient upon administration of
one or more of said unit dosage forms;
and wherein said unit dosage form provides for coordinated release such that:
i) said NSAID is surrounded by a coating that, upon ingestion of said unit
dosage form by said patient, prevents the release of essentially any NSAID
from said dosage form unless the pH of the surrounding medium is 3.5 or
higher;
ii) at least a portion of said acid inhibitor is not surrounded by an enteric
coating and, upon ingestion of said unit dosage form by said patient, is
released regardless of whether the pH of the surrounding medium is below
3.5 or above 3.5.
1. A pharmaceutical composition in unit dosage form comprising therapeutically
effective amounts of:
(a) esomeprazole, wherein at least a portion of said esomeprazole is not
surrounded by an enteric coating; and
(b) naproxen surrounded by a coating that inhibits its release from said unit dosage
form unless said dosage form is in a medium with a pH of 3.5 or higher;
wherein said unit dosage form provides for release of said esomeprazole such that upon
introduction of said unit dosage form into a medium, at least a portion of said
esomeprazole is released regardless of the pH of the medium.337
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While the specification (according to the panel opinion) disclosed many features of
the claimed invention, “[i]t is undisputed that there is no experimental data
demonstrating the therapeutic effectiveness of any amount of uncoated PPI and
coated NSAID in a single dosage form,”nor is there any disclosure of formulations
wherein uncoated PPI could be used to raise gastrointestinal pH.338
The District Court found that Defendants had not shown the asserted claims to
be obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 nor not enabled or inadequately described under
35 U.S.C. § 112, and thus, that one of Dr. Reddy’s generic products did not infringe
the ‘907 Patent (granting summary judgment to Dr. Reddy’s on its noninfringement
motion).339 Specifically, the Court found that it would not have been obvious to use
a PPI according to the asserted claims to prevent gastrointestinal injury from an
NSAID, inter alia, because the art would have discouraged attempting such
formulations due to the known acid sensitivity of PPIs.340 Moreover, the District
Court held that the claims were enabled because the specification disclosed how to
make and use the invention. The Court relied on expert testimony in deciding that
the skilled worker would have recognized the usefulness of the claimed
formulations.341
With regard to Dr. Reddy’s written description challenges, the District Court
found that the use of the transition term “comprising” in the ‘285 Patent claims did
not cause the claims to encompass (undisclosed) embodiments having uncoated,
immediately released naproxen (an exemplified NSAID).342 The Court also rejected
a second challenge, that the claims encompass sustained-release as well as delayedrelease NSAID formulations not supported by the specification, because the claims
recited “inhibiting” rather than “preventing” NSAID release prior to achieving the
claimed raised pH levels. 343 Finally, the District Court rejected Defendants’’
argument that “ordinarily skilled artisans would not have expected [the claimed
formulation] to work and the specification provides no experimental data or
analytical reasoning showing the inventor possessed an effective uncoated PPI.”344
The Court held that “experimental data and an explanation of why an invention
works are not required, the specification adequately describes using uncoated PPI,
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and its effectiveness is necessarily inherent in the described formulation.”345
This appeal followed, limited to the District Court’s findings on the first and
third written description arguments; Nuvo cross-appealed on the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment of non-infringement by Dr. Reddy’s second
formulation.
The Federal Circuit reversed the District Court’s’ decision and dismissed Nuvo’s
cross-appeal, in an opinion by Judge Clevenger, joined by Chief Judge Prost and
Judge Wallach. The opinion states that the panel’s’ analysis “begins and ends” with
Defendants’ third written description argument related to a failure to show
“efficacy” of the claimed formulation.346 According to the Federal Circuit, the issue
was raised by Nuvo’s argument (related to Defendants’ obviousness assertions) that
“ordinarily skilled artisans would not have expected uncoated PPIs to be
effective.”347 Inconsistently, “nothing in the specification would teach a person of
ordinary skill in the art otherwise,” and this failure to disclose what was not found
in the art (and indeed, Nuvo affirmatively contended was not known in the art with
regard to the obviousness issue) amounts to a failure to describe how the inventors
were in possession of the claimed invention.348 The District Court’s error, according
to the Federal Circuit, was that its written description analysis on this point “does
not support its conclusions.” 349 Because of the “clear error” standard of review
imposed on the Federal Circuit on questions of fact (as the adequacy of disclosure
sufficient to satisfy the written description requirement is), the opinion asserts that
the panel “scour[ed] the record created below for evidence supporting the District
Court’s written description finding.”350
To no avail. In part, the panel came to this conclusion because they appreciated
that Nuvo raised “at least five arguments” (“for the first time on appeal, and as its
lead argument”) directed to reading any effectiveness language or requirement
from the asserted claims. 351 These arguments were, in the panel’s view,
contradicted by the plain language (and plain meaning thereof) of the claims (claim
1 of the ‘907 Patent recites “. . . in an amount effective to raise the gastric pH of said patient
to at least 3.5,” and claim 1 of the ‘285 Patent recites “. . . comprising therapeutically
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effective amounts of [the PPI].”)352 But the opinion sets forth and rejects each one.
First, Nuvo argued that the dosage form as a whole does not need to be effective
in raising gastric pH; the Federal Circuit agreed but did not find any of Defendants’
argument to be to the contrary.353
Second, Nuvo argued that the claims do not require the NSAID and PPI to be in
a single dosage form but “only amounts of each component effective on their
own.”354 Defendants argued that the claim “requires coordinated release achieved
by an effective amount of uncoated PPI that raises the gastric pH to at least 3.5 and
an effective amount of naproxen that is released to treat pain when the pH reaches
the desired level”; the panel held that Nuvo had not presented this argument below,
and thus it was forfeited.355
Third, Nuvo contended that the claim didn’t require the uncoated PPI to be
effective to raise gastric pH, just that the formulation contained an effective
amount of uncoated PPI. 356 In addition to holding Nuvo had also forfeited this
argument by not raising it below, the panel termed it “nonsensical to read the claims
to require effective amounts of uncoated PPI without specifying the result
effectively achieved.”357
Fourth, Nuvo asserted that the claims encompassed “multiple dosage forms,”
and thus, the specification did not need to expressly describe any particular
effective dosage form. 358 Rather than summarily dismissing this argument, the
opinion expressly disagreed with it: the ‘285 Patent “does not allow for more than
one dosage form” and “[e]ven if it were true that the ‘907 [P]atent allows more than
one dosage form to effectively raise the gastric pH to at least 3.5 using uncoated PPI,
the specification would still need to provide support for the notion that uncoated
PPI is effective,” according to the Court.359
Finally, the panel rejected Nuvo’s’ argument that the Examiner interpreted the
claims in a manner consistent with their argument, that “the ‘907 [P]atent claims []
merely require[d] certain amounts of PPI and NSAID effective on their own rather
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than requiring an overall efficacy for the combined drug.” 360 The panel found
Nuvo’s argument relied in this regard on arguments the Court had already rejected
and besides, in their view “the Examiner appears to have interpreted the claims to
require an amount of PPI, whether coated or uncoated, effective to raise the gastric
pH to the desired level” and that was the written description required (and lacking)
in Nuvo’s specification.361
Having decided what the law requires the written description to be, the panel
then reported its failure to find such support in the specification. Nuvo’s attempt
to rely on expert testimony was unavailing, in part because this testimony was
sufficiently particular that the Court was able to review and reject it. Specifically,
the opinion states that:
The statements [the expert] points to recite the claim limitation by simply calling
generally for effective amounts of uncoated PPI, but our precedent clearly establishes
that is not enough . . . . We have expressly rejected the “argument that the written
description requirement . . . is necessarily met as a matter of law because the claim
language appears in ipsis verbis in the specification.”362

Experimental evidence is not required,363 nor is there any requirement for a
“theory or explanation of how or why a claimed composition will be effective,”364 nor
does an invention need to be reduced to practice.365 But here, “there is nothing in
the specification of the patents-in-suit showing ‘that the inventor actually invented
the invention claimed.’” 366 The Court concluded that the specification is “fatally
flawed” with regard to providing an adequate written description of the requisite
efficacy recited in the claims and reversed the District Court’s finding that
Defendants had not established that the ‘907 and ‘285 Patents were invalid for
failure to satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.367
III. CONCLUSIONS

Many other biotechnology patent court cases were decided in 2019. The patent
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interference dispute over CRISPR/Cas9 inventions continued, with Sigma Aldrich
attempting to provoke an interference that would surely render this dispute even
more complicated. Congress turned its attention again to 35 U.S.C. § 101, though
without tangible results, while the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari on
several petitions concerning § 101. Many other issues of patent doctrine were
explored, such as public use, on-sale bars to patentability, and experimental use
exceptions,368 but did not make our cut of the top 10 biotechnology patent decisions
of 2019.
For half a century, biotechnology patent law has occupied a niche in the wider
realm of patent law. Highlighting fascinating scientific discoveries, promising new
approaches to solving human problems at some undefined point in the future, and
posing various interesting challenges to existing legal doctrine; biotechnology has
nevertheless been widely regarded as a small and eccentric niche of patent law. The
SARS-CoV-2 virus and the COVID-19 pandemic it has caused has shone a bright
light on the clear and present importance of biotechnology and how patent law
ought to approach it to ensure humanity receives full benefits from its powerful
discoveries. Suddenly, biotechnology stands at the vanguard of patent law,
transforming the sound crafting, interpretation, and application of biotechnology
law high on the list of societal priorities. Vaccines offer a vivid example of this, with
new and innovative approaches, such as mRNA-based methods, raising worldwide
hopes for a cure to COVID-19 and to the economic and social ravages it has caused.
Biotechnology patent law will play an increasingly important role in helping to
respond to societal issues. Understanding it better is an immediate imperative.
We began our effort to choose and describe the 10 most important
biotechnology patent decisions in Biotechnology Patent Law Top Ten of 2018 - Broad
Wins, Sovereignty Loses, and Patents Dance.369 We intend to continue this effort each
year, with our next article covering the 10 most important biotechnology patent
decisions of 2020.
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